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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
Introduction 
This appeal concerns whether Keith Smith is entitled to half of the 
inheritance that his ex-wife, Sharon Smith, received from her mother, even 
though the trial court found that the inheritance money was not marital 
property. Keith admits that the family's trust document, the Smith Family Trust 
("Family Trust"), which governs the ownership of the inheritance, gave Sharon 
the inheritance as her separate property. But Keith asserts that once Sharon 
deposited her $750,000 inheritance check into her own, separate bank account 
instead of cashing it-assuming one can cash a check that large-the inheritance 
that under the Family Trust was Sharon's separate property thereby became the 
property of both Keith and Sharon. Keith's interpretation finds no support in the 
plain language of the Family Trust, violates principles of contract interpretation, 
and, if correct, would require the court to enforce an absurd result. 
Apart from advancing a rather implausible interpretation of the Family 
Trust, Keith fails to mention that after the trial court found that the inheritance 
was not marital property and belonged to Sharon alone, the trial court awarded 
Keith alimony based upon Sharon's ability to pay alimony, an ability she has 
only because of the inheritance. Keith is therefore receiving part of the 
inheritance anyway. For that reason, if this court reverses the trial court's finding 
that the inheritance is marital property, it should vacate the alimony award. 
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Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined 
that the 2012 distribution of inheritance Sharon Smith received from her mother's 
estate was her separate property. 
Standard of Review: '"Trial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal 
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated."' Ston.ehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ,rs, 176 P.3d 476 (alteration omitted). 
Conditional Cross-Appeal: If this court reverses the trial court's decision 
below and instead holds that the 2012 distribution is marital property, then the 
issue becomes whether to vacate an alimony award based upon Sharon's ability 
to pay with the inheritance as her separate property where that ability no longer 
exists. 
Standard of Review: Where a trial court's basis for alimony no longer 
exists, this court will consider the issue itself and reverse and remand for a 
reconsideration of alimony. McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ,r16, 265 
P.3d 839. 
Determinative Provisions 
The following provisions and cases are set forth at Addendum C: 
Utah Code § 30-3-5 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case concerns the distribution of property and awarding of alimony in 
a divorce case. For years, Sharon Smith received a trickle of money from her 
mother. But in 2012, after her mother died, Sharon received a $750,000 
distribution (" the 2012 distribution") from her mother's estate. She received this 
in the form of a check, as she had received other money from her mother. Sharon 
opened a new, separate account and deposited the inheritance check into it. 
At trial, Keith asserted that he was entitled to half of the 2012 distribution, 
not because he was entitled to half of the inheritance, but that he became entitled 
to half of the 2012 distribution when Sharon deposited the check into her 
separate account instead of cashing the check. Keith based his argument on his 
reading of the Smith Family Trust documents ("Family Trust"). 
The trial court rejected Keith's arguments on two grounds. First, the court 
found that the Family Trust declares that Sharon's inheritance is her separate 
property and not part of the marital estate. Second, when dividing the marital 
estate, the court found that it was most equitable to award Sharon her entire non-
commingled inheritance. Thus, in the Decree of Divorce, entered March 26, 2015, 
the trial court found that the 2012 distribution is not marital property. 
But the trial court did award Keith alimony that Sharon must pay using 
her inheritance. Sharon therefore conditionally cross-appeals the alimony award 
if she no longer retains her full inheritance. 
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2. Statement of Facts 
The critical facts concern the creation of the Smith Family Trust, described 
below in section 2.2, and the distribution that Sharon received from her mother's 
estate in 2012, described below in section 2.4. To provide this court with a more 
complete understanding of the trial court's decision, Sharon also provides the 
following information. 
2.1 Background 
Sharon Smith and Keith Smith married in 1979. (R.181:11.) They had five 
children, who were born between 1980 and 1993. (R.181:11-12.) Finances were 
always tight. (R.181:15,16.) 
Sharon's mother had a significant amount of money from a family farm. 
(R.181:19.) In 1978, before Sharon married Keith, Sharon's mother set up a 
partnership to distribute her wealth to her children. (R.181:19.) The name of the 
partnership was the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership. (R.181:20; Pet. 
Ex. 1.) Sharon's mother transferred part of her interest to each of her children 
every year while she was alive. (R.181:19.) In 1999, Sharon received 
approximately $60,000. (R.181:52-53.) Sharon deposited that money in a joint 
account and the parties used that money to pay their family expenses. (R.181:53.) 
Sharon and Keith frequently had to accept money from Sharon's mother. 
(R.181:14,18.) In 2002, when finances were extremely tight for Sharon and Keith, 
Sharon's mother decided to give Sharon and her siblings each approximately 
$3,000 to 5,000 of their inheritance on a monthly basis. (R.181:18,53.) Sharon's 
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portion was deposited in a joint account and Sharon and Keith lived almost 
exclusively on that money. (R.181:21-22,53-54.) Keith also began collecting Social 
Security Disability Income. (R.181:25.) 
Sharon and Keith had joint checking accounts, into which they deposited 
distributions from the partnership and disability payments. (R.181:58.) 
2.2 Sharon and Keith draft the Smith Family Trust 
After a dispute over finances that almost ended in divorce in 2005, Sharon 
and Keith hired a lawyer to draft a family trust document ("Family Trust"). 
(R.78-107;181:25,80 (attached at Addendum D).) The parties signed the Family 
Trust on September 22, 2006. (R.103.) Keith thought a trust was a good idea 
because it would shield the house and inheritance from bankruptcy. (R.181:26.) 
Sharon testified that, when discussing the inheritance, Keith told Sharon that he 
understood that the money was hers. (R.181:24-25, 89.) Keith testified that he did 
not understand the meaning of the Family Trust. (R.181:80.) 
The Family Trust creates The Smith Fao::i.ily Trust and divides it into two 
~ separate trusts: the Keith L. Smith Trust ("KlS Trust"), and the Sharon L. Smith 
Trust ("SLS Trust"). (R.78-107.) Attached to the Family Trust was "Schedule A," 
which listed the assets of the trust. (R.105-06; attached to Family Trust at 
Addendum D and copied in full at Argument 1.1.) Subsection 2 states that the 
Family Trust includes "[t]he following accounts in the following institutions, 
together with all future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also 
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including all new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, 
interest or accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new 
accounts are opened in the future: ... [identifying specific bank accounts]." 
(R.105.) Subsection 4 states that the SLS Trust retains "[a]ll right, title and interest 
in and to the following: All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher 
Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership." (R.106.) 
2.3 The 2012 inheritance distribution 
In January 2011, Sharon's mother died. (R.181:30.) At that time, Sharon 
received approximately $10,000 from her mother's insurance and additional 
money from the sale of her mother's house. (R.181:30-31.) Sharon and Keith lived 
on that money. (R.181:31.) Beginning in about February 2012, Sharon and Keith 
began living on different floors of the same house. (R.181:38.) 
In October 2012, Sharon received a distribution from her mother's trust 
("'2012 distribution"). (R.181:33.) She received a check in the mail for $750,000. 
(R:181:7,8,32,33-34,119,147.) She opened two money market accounts in her own 
name at Zion's Bank and deposited the check into them. (R.181:33-34.) 
She testified that, in her understanding, cashing the check- i.e., walking 
out of the bank with $750,000 in cash-was not an option, because "no one 
would cash that big of a check. It had to be ... deposited." (R.181:34.) 
She also testified that, in order to protect her 2012 distribution, she hired 
an attorney to draft a new trust ("new trust") and then she placed the money 
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from the 2012 distribution into accounts owned by the new trust. (R.181:35-69-
71.) She paid taxes and tithing and invested the remainder. (R.181:34,36,52.) 
2.4 Separation and Divorce 
In March 2013, Sharon and Keith separated their joint accounts. (R.181:37.) 
After that, Keith did not help pay for the mortgage, utilities, or living expenses. 
(R.181:38-39.) In October 2013, Sharon filed for divorce. (R.181:39.) In May 2014, 
she moved out of the marital home but continued to pay its mortgage. (R.181:38, 
42.) In August 2014, a court commissioner ordered Keith to start paying $200 per 
month toward the mortgage but he did not do so. (R.181:43.) 
In February 2015, the parties went to trial to resolve outstanding issues 
related to the divorce, many of which are not at issue in this appeal. (R.138-139.) 
Relevant here, Keith argued that he was entitled to half of Sharon's inheritance 
and, if the court disagreed, that he needed alimony. (R.181:5-6.) 
As to Sharon's inheritance, the trial court found that it was Sharon's 
separate property for two separate reasons. (R. 65-66, Divorce Decree, attached at 
~ Addendum A; 157-59, Findings of Fact, attached at Addendum B.) The trial court 
found that under subsection 4 of the Family Trust's Schedule A, all distributions 
belonged to Sharon alone, regardless of whether she placed them into a separate 
"account," and that subsection 2 of Schedule A did not include the inheritance. 
(R.158-59.) The trial court also determined that the inheritance was Sharon's 
separate property under traditional Utah law regarding inheritance upon 
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divorce. (R.158-59.) The trial court concluded that she had commingled the pre-
2012 distributions but not the 2012 distribution. The trial court therefore 
concluded that the 2012 distribution was hers alone. (R.158-59.) 
Finally, regarding alimony, Sharon testified that she still needed to work 
six more quarters before she would be eligible for Social Security. (R.181:36.) At 
that time, she will receive $162 per month. (R.181:36.) Other than his Social 
Security Disability Income, Keith has no retirement income. (R.181:36,84.) The 
trial court found that Keith had unmet needs and that Sharon could afford to 
meet them with her inheritance. The trial court ordered Sharon to pay Keith $502 
per month for 35 years, which is the length of the marriage, terminating upon 
Keith's death, remarriage, or cohabitation. (R.160, 167.) 
2.5 Keith's appeal 
Keith appeals. He does not directly challenge the Divorce Decree. He also 
does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that, under traditional rules 
regarding inheritance upon divorce, the 2012 distribution is Sharon's separate 
property. Instead, he challenges the trial court's interpretation of the Family 
Trust. Specifically, he challenges the trial court's conclusion that the 2012 
distribution remained Sharon's alone after she opened a new checking account 
and deposited the 2012 distribution in it. 
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Summary of the Argument 
This appeal concerns whether a $750,000 inheritance that Sharon received 
from her mother's estate ("2012 distribution") belongs to Sharon alone or is 
marital property. The trial court found the 2012 distribution belonged to Sharon 
alone because (i) the Family Trust unambiguously specifies that it belonged to 
Sharon alone, and (ii) it was her separate property that she deposited into a 
separate account and did not commingle with the marital estate. The Divorce 
Decree states that the 2012 distribution is not marital property. 
Keith does not challenge directly on appeal the Divorce Decree, which is 
the operative document that divides the parties' property and declares that the 
2012 distribution is not marital property. The trial court was within its discretion 
when it found that the 2012 distribution was Sharon's separate property, and 
Keith does not challenge directly that finding reflected in the Divorce Decree. 
Instead, Keith takes an indirect approach. Keith asserts that, without 
regard to principles that divide marital property, the trial court erred as a matter 
~ of law when it interpreted the Family Trust. Under Keith's interpretation of the 
Family Trust, he was entitled to half of the 2012 distribution when Sharon 
deposited her $750,000 check from her mother's estate into her own separate 
money market account. 
The trial court rejected Keith's novel interpretation and found that the 
Family Trust separated Sharon's interest in her mother's estate from all other 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 accounts" owned by the parties, even after Sharon deposited her $750,000 check 
into a new, separate account that she opened for that purpose. The trial court's 
interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the Family Trust and the 
intent of the settlors. Under that language, the 2012 distribution belongs to 
Sharon alone. And under the language concerning II accounts," only monies 
deposited into the parties' established joint accounts became marital property. 
The trial court correctly concluded that when Sharon deposited her separate 
property into her separate account, it did not morph into marital property. 
Keith's interpretation also leads to absurd results and renders a subsection 
of the Family Trust meaningless. Under Keith's interpretation, had Sharon spent 
the 2012 distribution or kept it under her mattress, Keith would not have been 
entitled to any of it. But as long as she deposited it in an II account," he was 
entitled to half. Keith provides no explanation of why Sharon, or any reasonable 
person, would have intended that result. There is no explanation. 
Keith also fails to mention the alimony award. In awarding alimony to 
Keith, the trial court determined that Sharon should use her inheritance to pay Ci> 
alimony to Keith. The court awarded Keith $502 per month in alimony, for the 
length of the marriage (35 years). Should that entire sum be paid out, Keith 
would eventually receive (502 x 12 x 35) = $210,840. In other words, by looking to 
Sharon's separate property in setting the alimony award, the court effectively 
awarded Keith an enormous portion of Sharon's net inheritance. 
10 
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I.@ 
Argument 
The trial court found that Sharon's 2012 distribution from her mother's 
estate was her separate property, not marital property. Keith does not directly 
attack that finding reflected in the Divorce Decree, but instead argues only that 
the Family Trust signed by Keith and Sharon entitles him to half of Sharon's 2012 
distribution after she deposited it into a separate "new account." 
Examining the Family Trust alone, the trial court's finding was correct. 
Keith's interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the Family Trust, 
with the settlors' intent, and with common sense. Keith's interpretation leads to 
an absurd result, wherein Sharon's inheritance remains her separate property as 
long as the $750,000 check is cashed, but somehow becomes marital property 
once she deposits that cash into her own, separate bank account. 
Keith appears to believe that the issue does not hinge on the trial court's 
discretionary distribution of property, but instead hinges only on the 
interpretation of the Family Trust. But even if the Family Trust were interpreted 
as Keith argues, trial courts have discretion to make equitable orders regarding 
the division of property, even in the face of an agreement by the parties. Utah 
Code§ 30-3-5; Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472,476 (Utah 1975); Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT 
App 26, ,r39, 321 P.3d 200. Keith has not challenged the trial court's property 
division. If the court agrees with Sharon on this point, which is discussed in 
detail in Argument 2, infra, there is no reason to read further, as this court may 
affirm the trial court's finding on that ground alone. 
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As described below, in addition to exercising its discretion to find that 
Sharon's inheritance was her separate property, the trial court correctly 
interpreted the Family Trust to reach the same result. 
1. The trial court's interpretation of the Family Trust was correct 
Before considering the parties' arguments, it is necessary to understand the 
structure of the Smith Family Trust (the "Family Trust"). The Family Trust is 
divided into two trusts: the Keith L. Smith Trust ("KLS Trust"), and the Sharon L. 
Smith Trust ("SLS Trust"). (R.78-107; attached at Addendum D.) The Family 
Trust lays out the provisions that govern the trusts, including any additions, and 
the attached Schedule A lists the property that was granted to the individual 
trusts. Schedule A lists Sharon and Keith's assets and delineates whether the 
property is being placed in the KLS Trust, the SLS Trust, or is to be shared 
between the KLS & SLS trusts equally. (R.105-06, attached at Addendum D and 
repeated in full below in Argument 1.2.1.) 
In this appeal, subsections 2 and 4 of Schedule A, as well as Article II, are 
relevant to whether Sharon's inheritance remained her separate property. 
Subsection 2 refers to the parties' bank accounts. (R.105.) It states: "The 
following accounts in the following institutions, together with all future 
additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all new accounts 
and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or accumulation in any 
and all other financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the 
12 
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future" and then lists only one account, a joint account at the Tooele Federal 
Credit Union belonging to both the SLS and KLS Trust. (R.105.) 
Subsection 4 refers to Sharon's interest in her mother's estate. (R.106.) It 
states: 11 All right, title and interest in and to the following:" and then states that 
11 All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited 
Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership" belong to the SLS Trust. (R.106.) 
Keith asserts that once Sharon received the 2012 distribution, described in 
subsection 4 as deriving from the 11Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership," 
and deposited it into "a new account" - but not the joint account listed in 
subsection 2-the separate inheritance became marital property. The trial court 
rejected Keith's argument, and instead found that the "interest" described in 
subsection 4 did not lose its character when Sharon deposited the 2012 
distribution into her separate bank account, opened expressly for that purpose. 
In the Divorce Decree, attached at Addendum A, the trial court wrote that: 
(9) As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the 
Partnership was an inheritance. 
(10) All of the monies th[at] came from the partnership and 
distributions out of the partnership, not including gifts from the 
mother that came from her personal assets, were the Petitioner's 
inheritance. 
(11) In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family 
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule) A, which 
states II All right, title and interest in and to the following: All interest 
of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited 
Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership." 
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(12) All interest of Sharon L. Smith in the Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Parb.lership included distributions and they were simply 
part of the partnership. 
(13) The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to 
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner. 
(14) The language of number 2 of Exhibit (Schedule A) was for other 
assets but did not include interest in the Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Parb.lership. 
(R. 165-66.) Based upon these statements, the trial court found that /.([Sharon's] 
interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Parb.lership is her separate 
inheritance." (R.160; see also R.166.) 
1.1 Under the language of the Family Trust as a whole, Sharon's 
inheritance was assigned exclusively to the Sharon L. Smith Trust 
Keith contends that, under subsection 2 of Schedule A of the Family Trust, 
the 2012 distribution became marital property when Sharon deposited it into a 
newly opened bank account. Keith's argument ignores the plain language of the 
Family Trust and instead reads the language out of context. 
To begin, it is necessary to view the Family Trust as a whole. Article II of 
the Family Trust, called II Additions to the Trust," controls how II additional 
property" was to be integrated into the two trusts set up under the Smith Family ~ 
Trust. Article II states that any new property acquired by any 11Trustee"1 
becomes part of the trust into which it is transferred. 
1 The /.(Trustees" are defined in Article XXVII: 
1. Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith, Trustors, as Co-Trustees of The Smith 
Family Trust. 
2. Keith L. Smith, Grantor, as Trustee of The Keith L. Smith Trust. 
3. Sharon L. Smith, Grantor, as Trustee of The Sharon L. Smith Trust. (R.97.) 
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The most relevant parts of Article II are highlighted: 
A. It is understood that the Trustors or any other person may 
grant and the Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional 
and re~l property by assignment, transfer, deed or other 
conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary or inter vivos, for 
inclusion in the Trust herein created. 
B. The Smith Family Trust shall be divided into two separate 
Trusts, The Keith L. Smith Trust and the Sharon L. Smith Trust. Any 
additional property received by the Trustee shall become a part of the Trust 
into which it is transferred and sh.all become subject to the terms of this 
Agreement. If such property is not specifically appointed to any 
particular Trust, it shall be allocated equally between the Keith L. 
Smith Trust and the Sharon L. Smith Trust, if both of the Trustors 
are living, and otherwise to the Shelter Trust set forth therein. 
Property held in the name of "THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST" shall 
be allocated equally between the two Trusts and shall be subject to 
the respective provisions in the next two sentences. Property held as 
"THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST" is the exclusive property of Keith 
L. Smith, and Sharon L. Smith hereby expressly waives all interests, 
including community property interests and separate property. 
interests, therein. Property held as UTHE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST" 
is the exclusive property of Sharon L. Smith, and Keith L. Smith hereby 
expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and 
separate property interests, therein .. .. 
(R.78-79 (emphasis added.)) 
Additionally, Article VII of the Family Trust, entitled "Statement of 
Intention," indicates that" all future real and personal properties acquired by the 
Trustors are to be a part of, or to automatically become a part of, this Trust at the 
time acquired by the Trustors." (R.81.) In other words, when Sharon, as the sole 
trustor and trustee of the Sharon L. Smith Trust, received any new property, 
Article II.B assigned it to Sharon and therefore to the Sharon L. Smith Trust. 
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And as trustee of the Sharon L. Smith trust, Sharon had statutory authority 
to "deposit trust money in an account in a regulated financial service 
institution." Utah Code§ 75-7-814. Thus, if, under Article II, Sharon opted to 
deposit that property into an account in her own name - as opposed to a joint 
account- she did not thereby transfer the property into another trust, or make 
the property marital. Moreover, as described below, Schedule A, which is simply 
a list of the property that was to be transferred to the Smith Family Trust from 
Keith and Sharon Smith, does not state that Sharon's property would become 
joint when she deposited it into a newly created account. (R.78.) 
1.1.1 Subsection 2 of Schedule A does not convert all new 
accounts into marital property 
Consistent with the above provisions, subsection 2 of Schedule A does not 
by itself automatically convert any new account into marital property, nor was it 
ever intended to do so. First, Schedule A is a list of the property that was to be 
conveyed to the trusts created by the Family Trust and does not contain the 
substantive governing provisions of the Family Trust. Second, Schedule A 
assigns all property listed in its subsections to either the KLS Trust, the SLS 
Trust, or the KLS & SLS Trusts equally. Finally, the language of Schedule A 
subsection 2 does not automatically assign new accounts to both trusts. 
Article I of the Family Trust states that Keith and Sharon "hereby transfer 
and deliver to the Trustees and their successors the property listed in Schedule 
'A', to have and to hold the same ... pursuant to any of the provisions hereof, ... for 
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the uses and purposes and upon the terms and conditions herein set forth." (R.78 
(emphasis added.)) Schedule A is a list of the property transferred to the newly 
created trusts and is held pursuant to the provisions of the Family Trust, not 
independent of them. The language of one subsection of a list of property cannot 
be considered in absence of the controlling provisions of the Family Trust, as 
Keith suggests. But even if the court were to interpret the language in Schedule A 
in isolation, there is no support for Keith's interpretation of subsection 2. 
For context, it is helpful to review Schedule A in its entirety: 
KEITH L. SMITH and SHARON L. SMITH, Grantors, do hereby sell, 
transfer, convey, quitclaim and assign for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, all rights, title and interests 
in the property set forth below to the Grantors as Trustees of THE 
SMITH FAMILY TRUST, dated the 22 day of September, 2006, 
Grantee. In addition, property listed under the ownership category 
KLS is the exclusive property of THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST, 
property listed as SLS is the exclusive property of THE SHARON L. 
SMITH TRUST, and property designated KLS & SLS is owned 
equally by the two Trusts. 
1. All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the 
following real estate, together with all present and future 
improvements thereon, and all present and future water and water 
rights thereunto belonging and also including all present and all 
future personal property located thereon or wheresoever located: 
Ownership 
SlS A. Lot 12, Castagno Acres Subdivision, as described in the 
plat maps and records on file at the County Recorder's Office, 
Tooele County, State of Utah. 
[Tax Parcel Number] 
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH 
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2. The following accounts in the following institutions, together 
with all future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also 
including all new accounts and the accumulations and the future 
additions, interest or accumulation in any and all other financial 
institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future: 
Ownership 
KLS&SLS A. Tooele Federal Credit Union 
[Account Number] 
[names of 4 accounts] 
3. Vehicles: 
Ownership 
KLS & SLS A. 2002 Chevrolet 
[Vehicle Identification Number] 
[Utah Title Number] 
KLS & SLS B. 1990 Chevrolet 
[Vehicle Identification Number] 
[Utah Title Number] 
4. All right, title and interest in and to the following: 
SLS A. All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher 
Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership. 
(R. l 05-06.) 
The preamble to Schedule A states that all of the property listed can belong 
either to The Keith L. Smith Trust, the Sharon L. Smith Trust, or both equally. It 
does not state that future property would be subject to equal ownership and it 
does not indicate preference for the division of new property. 
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Keith relies on the latter part of subsection 2, which states that "and also 
including all new accounts ... in any and all other financial institutions in which 
new accounts are opened in the future." (R.105.) Keith argues that when Sharon 
opened a new account in her name, that account became marital property. But in 
fact, the language of subsection 2 that Keith cites does not say anything about 
ownership or assignment of the named "new accounts," or, for that matter, any 
account. It identifies that the Tooele Federal Credit Union accounts belong to 
both the KLS & SlS Trust. That is the only mention of ownership in the 
subsection. The critical language that Keith implies would assign equal 
ownership to any new account does not exist. 
As with everything else in Schedule A, ownership by one or both of the 
trusts is assigned on an item by item basis, not categorically by subsection. Under 
subsection 2, the one item listed happens to be held jointly by both trusts. This in 
no way assigns, let alone reassigns, ownership in new accounts; it cannot be 
interpreted to mean that any other account that might have been or may in the 
future be listed under this subsection should also be under joint ownership. 
To illustrate, compare subsections 1 and 2. Subsection 1 applies to real 
property "and also including all present and all future personal property located 
thereon or wheresoever located." The single item under this subsection is a piece 
of real property assigned to the Sharon L. Smith Trust exclusively. Under Keith's 
interpretation, subsection 1 would give the Sharon L. Smith Trust sole ownership 
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of all future personal property acquired by either Sharon or Keith, wheresoever 
that property may be located. If Keith's interpretation were correct, he would 
never be able to own any personal property or any portion of personal property. 
In contrast, as explained below, subsection 4 differs in structure and language, 
indicating that the parties intended an automatic assignment of ownership. 
1.1.2 Subsection 4 assigns sole ownership of the inheritance 
distribution to Sharon 
Keith does not contend that the 2012 distribution did not fall under 
subsection 4 or that" all right, title and interest in and to" the inheritance was 
owned by the SLS Trust. Nor does Keith challenge the court's conclusion that the 
2012 distribution, when delivered to Sharon as a check, was part of "[Sharon's] 
interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership." (R.160.) Instead, 
Keith asserts that when Sharon deposited the check into an" account" - any 
account-it lost its status as her "interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited 
Partnership," as described in subsection 4, and became "a new account" under 
subsection 2. (R.181:129-31; Op. Br. at 9.) Based on that assertion, Keith argues 
that the distribution transformed from separate property to marital property. 
This is contrary to the plain language of subsection 4, which reaffirms 
Sharon as the sole owner of her inheritance. Subsection 4 unequivocally assigns 
Sharon's inheritance to the Sharon L. Smith Trust exclusively. 
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Subsection 4 reads: 
4. All right, title and interest in and to the following: 
SLS A. All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher 
Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership. 
(R.106.) 
Notably, subsection 4 reads differently than subsections 1 and 2: it assigns 
Sharon's interest to the SLS Trust as a line item rather than as a category. Should 
other "rights, titles, and interests" become available in the future, they are 
currently unassigned. And indeed, the way subsection 4 is written sheds light on 
how subsection 2 could have been written if it meant what Keith says it means. If 
Keith were correct, subsection 2 would have had "all future accounts" as a 
named line-item, not as an introductory paragraph to a list of line-item accounts. 
In short, the language of the Family Trust as a whole indicates th~t any 
new property received by Sharon is property of the SLS Trust, including her 
interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, regardless of what 
she does with it. But even were Keith's interpretation correct, however, his 
argument still fails for the following reasons. 
1.2 The trial court did not err as a matter of law when it interpreted 
the Family Trust such that the 2012 distribution remained 
Sharon's separate property 
The trial court determined that "all distributions" from the Luveda Fincher 
Family Limited Partnership were "simply part of the partnership," and "belong 
to" Sharon. (R.160.) 
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Keith argues that the trial court's interpretation of subsection 2 "to exclude 
accounts where the funds originated from distributions from the Limited 
Partnership ... was error." (Op. Br. at 7-8.) Keith asserts that, contrary to the trial 
court's mterpretation, subsection 2 encompasses every single account that will 
ever be opened by the parties, regardless of whether the money being deposited 
mto that account came from a source specifically excluded by another portion of 
the Family Trust. (Op. Br. at 7-8.) He also asserts that the trial court's "carve out" 
of funds that originated m the Limited Partnership is mcorrect because "a correct 
interpretation [of a trust] will harmonize and give effect to all of the provisions, 
and not favor one over the other." (Op. Br. at 8.) 
Keith asserts that it was the depositing of funds in.to an account that negates 
subsection 4. According to Keith, if Sharon wanted to keep three-quarters of a 
million dollars away from Keith, what she should have done was to "take the 
distribution in cash, reinvest it, spend it, or anything else," but not deposit it in a 
bank or brokerage "account." (Op. Br. at 9.) According to Keith, "once Sharon 
placed it in a financial account, the account was joint property and half of the 
account belonged to Keith." (Op. Br. at 9.) 
"Issues concerning the meaning of trust terms [ and] the legal effect of 
those terms ... are all matters of trust construction." Dahl, 2015 UT 79, if 24. This 
court should "employ familiar principles of contract interpretation when 
construing trust instruments." Id. if 29. And when "harmoniz[ing] the provisions 
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of a contract," this court examines II the entire contract and all of its parts in 
relation to each other and give[s] a reasonable construction of the contract as a 
whole to determine the parties' intent. Also, when interpreting the plain 
language, [this court] look[s] for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and 
avoids rendering any provision meaningless." Nolin v. S & S Const., Inc., 2013 UT 
App 94, ,r 13, 301 P.3d 1026. 
Under established principles of contract interpretation, Keith's argument is 
unpersuasive for the following reasons. 
1.2.1 Keith's interpretation renders subsection 4 invalid 
because it is impractical - or impossible - to make use of a 
$750,000 check without at least temporarily depositing it 
in an account 
Keith admits that under his interpretation, "Sharon could take the 
distribution in cash, reinvest it, spend it, or anything else," such as hide it under 
her mattress. (Op. Br. at 9.) He does not explain whether or how any of those 
actions would be possible without first depositing the check into an account. In 
fact, Sharon testified that it is not possible to cash a $750,000 check without at 
least temporarily depositing it in an account: "It has to - it had to be - no one 
would cash that big of a check. It had to be ... deposited ... [i]nto a financial 
account, yes." (R.181:34:13-23.) Keith has not challenged her testimony. 
Keith says Sharon could have spent it, invested it, or hidden it, but if the 
bank will not let her access it then in fact she cannot. In that event, her only 
choices were to continue to hold the check, in which case it is actually worth 
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nothing, or deposit it in a bank account, in which case Keith contends he is 
entitled to half. In other words, because any effort to use the money requires the 
use of an "account," there is no feasible way for Sharon to keep her inheritance 
separation as described by subsection 4. 
Without a realistic way to access the money without depositing it into an 
account, Keith's interpretation renders subsection 4 effectively meaningless 
because, practically speaking, there is no way for Sharon to use the money from 
the Luveda Fincher Family Partnership without depositing it in an account. 
Effectively, Keith argues that Sharon's inheritance is either useless or necessarily 
joint property - in which case, subsection 4 serves no real utility. This court may 
reject Keith's argument on that basis alone. When "harmoniz[ing] the provisions 
of a contract," this court examines II the entire contract and all of its parts in 
relation to each other and give[s] a reasonable construction of the contract as a 
whole to determine the parties' intent. Also, when interpreting the plain 
language, [this court] look[s] for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and 
avoids rendering any provision meaningless." Nolin, 2013 UT App 94, ,r 13. 
Keith's interpretation also leads to an absurd result wherein, if Sharon 
wishes to keep it separate from him, she can neither deposit nor cash her check. 
Our appellate courts have frequently rejected proposed contract interpretations 
that lead to absurd results. See, e.g. Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2013 
UT 12, if 15, 322 P.3d 620 (rejecting contract interpretation that would lead to 
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absurd results); Selvig v. Blockbuster Enters., LC, 2011 UT 39, if 28,266 P.3d 691 
(same); Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ,r15, 225 P.3d 185 (rejecting contract 
interpretation that "would require a strained reading and judicial contortion 
exceeding the bounds of reason" in favor of one that" does not produce absurd 
or harsh results"); Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Ass'n, 2005 UT App 327, ,r24, 
120 P.3d 34 (same). 
1.2.2 Keith's interpretation improperly favors a general 
provision over a specific provision, contrary to the rules 
of trust construction 
Even assuming that Keith was correct that any money received by the 
parties at any time that is deposited into any account belongs equally to the SLS 
& KLS Trust, and even assuming that Sharon could make use of the 2012 
distribution check without depositing it in an account, the rules of construction 
regarding trust interpretation demonstrate that the Family Trust keeps Sharon's 
interest in her mother's estate separate regardless of what she does with it. 
Like the rules of construction regarding statutes and contracts, the rules of 
\;j construction regarding trusts hold that "[g]eneral terms and provisions are 
restricted by specific terms and provisions following them." 90 C.J.S. Trusts§ 208. 
Given that fundamental rule, subsection 2-which is a more general provision-
must be construed with subsection 4- a more specific provision. 
Keith's interpretation ignores this rule of construction. He states that "a 
correct interpretation will harmonize and give effect to all of the provisions, and 
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not favor one over the other." (Op. Br. at 8.) Then he states that "[t]he literal 
language of [subsection 2] applies to all existing and future financial accounts of 
any kind at any financial institution - period. There is no room in the language to 
carve out the Brokerage Accounts. It was error for the Trial Court to interpret 
such a carve-out into the provision - effectively rewriting it post hoc for Sharon's 
benefit." (Op. Br. at 8.) 
Keith's description of the court's interpretation as a "carve-out" is 
intended to sound negative, but in fact, the interpretation that subsection 4 is a 
"carve-out" is entirely consistent with the rules of construction that a general 
provision regarding financial accounts must be restricted by the specific 
provision regarding Sharon's interest in her inheritance. Because a specific 
provision declares certain property to be separate, a more general provision 
governing accounts does not operate to negate it. 2 
In sum, under the canons of contract interpretation, the more general 
subsection 2 is restricted by the more specific subsection 4 and the trial court was 
correct in interpreting it this way. 
2 This is not to say that there was no way for Sharon to share her inheritance with 
Keith. She could have done various things to give him money. She could have, 
for example, commingled it, which is described below in Argument 2. The trial 
court determined that she had not. (R.159.) 
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1.2.3 The trial court's interpretation is consistent with the 
intent of the settlors 
The trial court's interpretation is also consistent with the intent of the 
settlors. Any analysis of trust language begins with a plain reading of the trust 
document itself in order to "ascertain the intent of the settlor." Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 
if 29. "The primary object of a court, in construing the provisions of a trust, is to 
carry out the intent of the trustor or trustors." Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, 
,rs, 285 P.3d 815 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Keith contends that Sharon's "interest" was her "bundle of rights," i.e., 
"the right to control the partnership, direct the use of its assets, obtain 
information from the partnership, enjoy the tax benefits of losses and deductions, 
and receive both cash and in-kind distributions, among other things," and those 
things remain Sharon's alone because she did not deposit them in an account. 
(Op. Br. at 9.) 
But the sticks in the bundle of rights that Keith names- not including the 
actual money-are not items that belong in a trust, nor are they items that could 
~ be taken away from Sharon by anyone other than her mother. As explained in 
the Restatement, "a trustee may hold in trust any interest in any type of 
property." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 40 (2003) ( emphasis added). Similarly, 
the Family Trust states that Schedule A lists the "property" of the parties, 
including" any cash, securities, or other property," and notes that" additional 
real and personal property" may be added. (R.78.) Schedule A refers to "all 
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rights, title and interests in the property" named, and subsection 4 refers to II all 
right, title and interest" in Sharon's inheritance. (R.105-06 (emphases added).) 
Keith's brief correctly states that II a correct interpretation will harmonize 
and give effect to all of the provisions, and not favor one over the other." (Op. Br. 
at 8.) But a harmonious reading of the entire Family Trust indicates that only real 
or personal property was intended to be in the Family Trust and that all real and 
personal property acquired by the parties in the future would automatically be 
part of the Family Trust, except for Sharon's inheritance.3 
1.3 Keith's argument is beside the point because Sharon created a new 
trust that amended, modified, or revoked that crucial portion of 
the Family Trust 
In any event, even if Keith were correct on every point, the relevant part of 
the Family Trust is no longer applicable. Sharon testified that after she received 
the 2012 distribution, she created a new trust ("new trust") that currently holds 
her inheritance. (R.181:35-36.) The Family Trust allows Sharon to revoke it and 
create a new trust: 11 As long as both of the Trustors are alive, each of them 
reserves the right, without the consent or approval of the other, to amend, 
modify or revoke their separate Trusts under this Agreement, in whole or in part, 
including this Trust, concerning the property that each has contributed to the 
Trust." (R.80.) When Sharon created her new trust, she revoked any part of the 
3 Keith's argument is not revived by his noting that the impact of the accounts 
provision" applied equally to both parties." (Op. Br. at 10, underlining in 
original). Subsection 4 makes clear that the parties knew, and had always known, 
that Sharon stood to inherit a large sum of money and that Keith did not. 
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Family Trust that controlled her inheritance, thereby negating the provisions 
Keith relies upon. 
Revocation of the Family Trust by the creation of a new trust is also 
allowable by statute: "Unless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the trust 
is irrevocable," which the Family Trust does not, "the settlor may revoke or 
amend the trust." Utah Code§ 75-7-605; see also Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, if if 31, 
38, --- P.3d --- (describing husband's ability as settlor to revoke or amend trust in 
accordance with the language of the trust); Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, 
iJif38-41, 266 P.3d 828 (describing settlor's ability under statute to amend trust); 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63 cmt. k (2003) ("If a revocable trust has more 
than one settlor, ... each settlor ... may revoke or amend the trust with regard to 
that portion of the trust property attributable to the settlor's contribution."). 
Moreover, even if she had not revoked the Family Trust, she still can. Thus, 
even if Keith's interpretation of the Family Trust were correct, his argument is 
beside the point. 
2. The trial court equitably divided the marital estate pursuant to 
customary rules regarding dividing inheritance upon divorce 
Throughout this brief, Sharon has pointed out that Keith has not directly 
challenged the divorce decree's division of property. Keith has limited his 
argument to a question of law regarding interpretation of a contract. 
It is worth reiterating that, in fact, it is the divorce decree-and not the 
Family Trust-that divides Sharon and Keith's property. In other words, which 
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party has which property after the divorce was determined not by the Family 
Trust but by the divorce decree, which Keith has not challenged. It is 
unsurprising that Keith has not directly attacked the divorce decree because, as 
described below, a trial court has discretion to distribute a marital estate and the 
trial court's division here was well within its discretion according to Utah law 
regarding the division of inheritance upon divorce. 
When a court renders a divorce decree, "the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to ... property." Utah Code§ 30-3-5(1). "Trial courts 
have considerable discretion in determining ... property distribution in divorce 
cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ,rs, 176 
P.3d 476 (internal quotation marks omitted). When deciding whether property is 
separate or marital, the trial court "look[s] to a party's actions as a manifestation 
of a spouse's intent to contribute separate property to the marital estate." Keyes v. 
Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ,r 28, 351 P.3d 90. 
Generally, appellate courts "defer to a trial court's categorization and 
equitable distribution of separate property due to the considerable discretion it 
has in this area." Id. if 29. 
2.1 The trial court was within its discretion when it divided the 
parties' property such that Sharon retained her separate property 
The legal framework for property division upon divorce is simple and 
well-established. Before a trial court distributes marital assets, the court must 
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first determine whether the disputed assets are marital or separate property. Dahl 
v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 1121, --- P.3d ---. 11Marital property is ordinarily all property 
acquired during marriage ... whenever obtained and from whatever source 
derived," Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and it "is 
ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses." Stonehocker, 2008 UT 
App 11, if 13. 
By contrast, "separate property, which may include premarital assets, 
inheritances, or similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse." Id. In 
most cases, "equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or 
she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate 
property." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320. Said differently, "trial courts making 
'equitable' property division pursuant to [Utah Code] section 30-3-5 should ... 
generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during 
the marriage ( or property acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, together 
with any appreciation or enhancement of its value." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
There are, however, two ways in which separate property may lose its 
separate character and thereby become subject to equitable division upon 
divorce. First, separate property may lose its separate character if 11 the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
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interest in it." Id. And second, separate property may lose its separate character if 
"the property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or 
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to 
the other spouse." Id. When making this assessment, the court "look[ s] to a 
party's actions as a manifestation of a spouse's intent to contribute separate 
property to the marital estate." Dahl, 2015 UT 79, iJ143. Moreover, "[t]he question 
of whether a gift or inheritance has remained separate is highly fact intensive 
and the trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and make that 
determination." Poll v. Poll, 2011 UT App 307, ,I6, 263 P.3d 534. 
2.2 The trial court determined that the 2012 distribution was Sharon's 
separate property 
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that all of the money Sharon 
had received from her mother was Sharon's inheritance and thus her separate 
property: 
(10) As to the ~uveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the Court 
believes that the Partnership was an inheritance. The way the Court 
views it is that the Petitioner's mother helped the parties. The Court 
believes that the help was appropriate, that there was a need there, 
and that Petitioner's mother addressed that need. 
(11) The court finds that all of the monies th[at] came from the 
partnership and distributions out of the partnership, not including 
gifts from the mother that came from her personal assets, were the 
Petitioner's inheritance. 
(R.157-58 (emphasis added).) 
But although the trial court determined that "all of the monies that came 
from the partnership ... were [Sharon's] inheritance," the trial court also held 
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that certain of the funds had been commingled. (R.159.) Specifically, the trial 
court found that the money Sharon received from her mother's estate before 
2012, which she had deposited into joint accounts and that the family had lived 
on, had been commingled and lost its separate quality, but that none of the 
money received in the 2012 distribution was commingled. (R.159.) The court 
wrote: 
(16) The Court finds that in order to pay family expenses, Petitioner 
used some proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came in. She 
used those for the family to survive. The court finds those amounts 
were commingled, but that she did not commingle the larger 
payment of $750,000 that was distributed from the partnership, and 
that remains as the Petitioner's sole and separate property. 
(R.159.) 
Keith has not challenged this factual finding. Nor could he because the 
finding is supported by the evidence at trial and in the record: the 2012 
distribution was deposited in a separate account Sharon created specifically for 
that purpose and was not commingled.4 
The trial court's finding that an equitable division of marital property 
leaves to Sharon the 2012 distribution stands unchallenged and, in any event, 
well within its discretion. (R.159.) 
4 The trial court did not address the question, but there was no evidence to 
suggest that Keith had "by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an 
equitable interest in" the 2012 distribution. Mortenson, 760 P.2d at 308. 
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2.3 The trial court's conclusion is also consistent with policy 
regarding Sharon's mother's intentions 
Finally, it is worth noting that the trial court's conclusion is consistent with 
Sharon's mother's intent that the money pass to Sharon. (Pet. Ex. 1.) Sharon's 
mother's intent is important under Utah law. In Mortensen, the Utah Supreme 
Court explained that the rules described above regarding inheritance upon 
divorce "accord[] with the normal intent of donors or deceased persons that their 
gifts and inheritances should be kept within their family and succession should 
not be diverted because of divorce." 760 P.2d at 308-09. The trial court's 
conclusion accords with Sharon's mother's intentions in her own trust. 
Conclusion 
This court should affirm the decision of the trial court because it correctly 
determined that the Family Trust intended that Sharon's inheritance would 
remain her separate property. If this court does not affirm, Sharon asks this court 
to remand for a redetermination of alimony, as described in Sharon's conditional 
cross-appeal below. 
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Conditional Cross-Appeal 
Statement of the Case 
This conditional cross-appeal is limited only to the issue of alimony, and is 
relevant only if this court reverses the trial court's finding that Sharon's 
inheritance is not marital property. If this court concludes that the 2012 
distribution was not Sharon's separate property, but was to be split between 
Sharon and Keith, then both Keith's needs and Sharon's ability to pay would 
change significantly. In fact, it may be, in that case, that Sharon is entitled to 
alimony, rather than Keith. If this court disturbs the trial court's decision 
regarding the 2012 distribution, this court should vacate the alimony award and 
remand for the trial court to recalculate alimony. 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court ordered Sharon to pay Keith alimony in the amount of $502 
per month on the basis that Keith had unmet needs and that, given her separate 
~ inheritance, Sharon could afford to meet them. (R.159.) The award is for the 
length of the marriage (35 years), terminating upon Keith's death, marriage, or 
cohabitation. (R.167.) Should that entire sum be paid out, Keith would eventually 
receive (502 x 12 x 35) = $210,840. Keith is not entitled to both half of Sharon's 
inheritance and alimony that can only be paid through Sharon's inheritance. 
Keith acknowledged this at trial, but does not mention it on appeal. (R.181:5-6.) 
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Argument 
In his appeal, Keith asserts that he is entitled to half of Sharon's separate 
property as a lump sum. Keith fails to mention that the alimony payments are 
connected to his not having received a portion of Sharon's separate property. 
Alimony awards are predicated on three primary factors, known as the 
Jones factors: 11 (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the 
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; and (iii) the ability of 
the payor spouse to provide support." Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, if if 94-95, --- P.3d 
---; Utah Code§ 30-3-5(8)(a). 
The trial court considered Keith's needs ($1,700 / month) and ability to 
meet his own needs through his social security payments ($1,198/month). 
(R.166-67.) Given her minimal income, the trial court considered Sharon's 
separate property in her ability to pay Keith alimony. (R.167.) Sharon's inability 
to pay through any other means was supported by Sharon's Financial 
Declaration. (R.41.) The trial court ordered Sharon to pay Keith $502 per month 
in alimony. (R.167.) 
If this court reverses the trial court's conclusion that Sharon's inheritance is 
her separate property, it follows that Keith's needs and Sharon's ability to pay 
would change significantly. 
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Relief Sought 
If this court determines that the trial court erred when it concluded that 
Keith was not entitled to any of Sharon's inheritance, then this court should 
remand for a recalculation of alimony. McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 
382, if 16, 265 P.3d 839. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2016. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES Boo 
J · J. Nelso 
Attorneys for Sharon Smith 
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Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(£)(1) 
I here by certify that: 
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. 
P. 24(£)(1) because this brief contains 9,011 words, excluding the parts of the brief 
exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l)(B). 
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. 
P. 27(b) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface 
using Microsoft Word 2010 in 13 point Book Antiqua. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2016. 
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Certificate of Service 
This is to certify that on the 4th day of March, 2016, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the Brief of A ppellee to be served on the following via first class 
mail, postage prepaid: 
Michael D. Black 
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101 South 200 East, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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JAIME TOPHAM (11782) 
LAW OFFICE OF JAIME TOPHAM, PLLC 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
291 NORTH RACE STREET 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-3426 
Dated: March 26, 2015 
06:36:54 PM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON SMITH 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KEITH SMITH 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 134300466 
Commissioner Michele Tack 
Judge Robert W. Adkins 
The parties came before the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins on 
February 12, 2015 for trial on the issues concerning the parties' divorce action. 
Sharon Smith was present with her attorney, Jaime Topham. Keith Smith was 
present with his attorney Michael D. Black. 
The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, heard argument, and having 
found proper grounds and jurisdiction, and being fully advised in the premises. and 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: 
ORDERED,ADJUDGED,andDECREED 
1. The parties are mutually granted a divorce a divorce from one another on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, such to become final upon signature and 
entry herein. 
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PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1. The court understands that both parties have emotional 
attachments to items of their son,-• but the court will 
leave the assets where they are presently. The painting shall 
remain with Petitioner and the chest shall remain with 
Respondent. 
2. The remaining personal property is awarded to each party, as 
they now possess it. 
REAL PROPERTY 
3. During the marriage the parties purchased a home together 
located at 
4. The house shall be sold and the proceeds of the sale shall be 
divided as follows: 
a. First, the mortgage and the costs of the sale to include realtor and title company 
costs shall be paid before dividing any proceeds; 
b. The remaining proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties with the 
following caveats: 
i. The court is ordering that because the Respondent didn't pay the $200.00 
per month under the Temporary Order, entered by the Court on 
December 5, 2015, that there shall be deducted from his share of the 
equity $200.00 per month starting September, 2014 and ending February 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 2 of7 
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2015, for a total of $1,200.00; and 
ii. Petitioner paid the full cost of the parties' two mediation 
sessions in the amount of $1 1 125.00. The Respondent 
shall pay half of the mediation expenses, in the amount of 
$562.50, which shall be deducted from his share of the 
equity. 
iii. Petitioner shall be awarded the amounts deducted from 
Respondent's share of the equity as stated above. 
5. The Respondent may continue to live in the home until it is 
sold. If he chooses to remain in the home, Respondent shall 
continue to pay $200.00 a month toward the mortgage as well 
as all utilities associated with the home while living there. 
Respondent shall pay the $200.00 to Petitioner each month. 
The Respondent shall take good care of the home and shall 
keep it in condition where it can be shown and in a condition 
that is acceptable to the realtor that is selected by the parties. 
6. The parties shall mutually agree upon the realtor selected to 
sell the home and each shall cooperate to get the home sold 
so that the equity can be taken out of the home and divided as 
ordered in paragraph 4(b). 
7. If there is a problem that develops and the realtor is of the 
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opinion that the home is not being sold because it is being 
lived it, the parties can address the issue with the Court by 
providing the Court with the information from the realtor. 
8. Petitioner's request for $5,328.00 in mortgage payments that 
she paid while Respondent was residing in the home shall not 
be granted. Respondent is responsible for the $200.00 a 
month to be paid toward the monthly mortgage payment as 
previously ordered in paragraph 4(b)(i), but no further 
recoupment is ordered. 
INHERITANCE 
9. As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the 
Partnership was an inheritance. 
10.AII of the monies the came from the partnership and 
distributions out of the partnership, not including gifts from the 
mother that came from her personal assets, were the 
Petitioner's inheritance. 
11. In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family 
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule) A, 
which states "All righ~ title and interest in and to the following: 
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limit~d Partnership." 
4of7 
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12.AII interest of Sharon L. Smith in the Luveda Fincher Family 
:;, 
Limited Partnership included distributions and they were 
simply part of the partnership. 
13. The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to 
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner. 1.'. 
~ 
;, 
14. The language of number 2 of Exhibit (Schedule A) was for ;, 
other assets but did not include interest in the Luveda Fincher 
Family Limited Partnership. 
15. In order to pay family expenses, Petitioner used some 
proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came in. She used 
those for the family to survive. Those amounts were 
comingled, but Petitioner did not comingle the larger payment 
of $750,000.00 that was distributed from the partnership, and 
that remains as the Petitioner's sole and separate property. 
16. Petitioner is entitled to funds in the Zions and LPL (formerly i 
I 
! 
Edward Jones) account and the accounts are the sole r·· 
! 
ll property of the Petitioner. ; , 
l--· 
ALIMONY 
t"' 
17. Respondent has medical circumstances and receives Social 
Security Disability in the amount of $1,198.00 per month as a t". 
i·' 
(: 
result of those circumstances. l 
I 
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18. Respondent has unmet needs. 
19. Petitioner's separate property is considered in determining the 
unmet needs of Respondent. 
20. Respondent's declaration has overstated his needs. 
Therefore his needs are set at $1,700.00 per month. 
21. Respondent's income is $1,198.00 per month and that his 
unmet expenses are $1,700.00 per month leaving a need for 
alimony in the amount of $502.00 per month. 
22. Petitioner shall pay alimony to Respondent in the amount of 
$502.00 per month, not to exceed the length of the marriage. 
Alimony shall terminate upon death, remarriage, or 
cohabitation by the Respondent. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
23. Each party shall pay their own attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this action. 
Approved as to Farm and Content: 
/s/ Michael D. Black 
Electronically signed by Jaime Topham with permission of Michael D. Black 
Attorney for Respondent 
END OF ORDER 
In accordance with the Utah State District Court's Efiling Standard No. 4, 
and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 10{e), this Order does not bear the 
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic 
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signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order. 
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JAIME TOPHAM (11782) 
LAW OFFICE OF JAIME TOPHAM, PLLC 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
291 NORTH RACE STREET 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-3426 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON SMITH 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KEITH SMITH 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 134300466 
Commissioner Michele Tack 
Judoe Robert W. Adkins 
The parties came before the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins on 
February 12, 2015 for trial on the issues concerning the parties' divorce action. 
Sharon Smith was present with her attorney, Jaime Topham. Keith Smith was 
present with his attorney Michael D. Black. 
The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, heard argument, and having found 
proper grounds and jurisdiction, and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby 
enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties have been actual and bona fide residents of Tooele County, Utah for at 
least three months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
2. The parties were married on December 15, 1979, in Maricopa County, Arizona, are 
husband and wife and maintained their marital domicile in Tooele County, Utah. 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 1 of 8 
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3. There are irreconcilable differences existing as to both parties and both parties are 
entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable difference. 
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PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1. The court understands that both parties have emotional 
attachments to items of their son,-· but the court will 
leave the assets where they are presently. The painting will 
remain with Petitioner and the chest will remain with 
Respondent. 
2. The remaining personal property is awarded to each party, as 
they now possess it. 
REAL PROPERTY 
3. During the marriage the parties purchased a home together 
located at 
4. The Court finds that the home was transferred to the Smith 
Family Trust to protect the home from the Respondent's 
potential liabilities. Respondent had been engaged in a 
business which entailed a higher than normal degree of risk. 
So the Court finds that the house was transferred to protect it 
from potential liabilities, but that the house remained a marital 
asset. 
5. The house should be sold and the proceeds of the sale should 
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be divided as follows: 
a. First, the mortgage and the costs of the sale to include realtor and title company 
costs should be paid before dividing any proceeds; 
b. The remaining proceeds will be divided equally between the parties with the 
following caveats: 
i. The court is ordering that because the Respondent didn't pay the $200.00 
per month under the Temporary Order, entered by the Court on 
December 5, 2015, that there will be deducted from his share of the 
equity $200.00 per month starting September, 2014 and ending February 
2015, for a total of $1,200.00; and 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 
ii. Petitioner paid the full cost of the parties' two mediation 
sessions in the amount of $1,125.00. The Respondent 
shall pay half of the mediation expenses, in the amount of 
$562.50, which will be deducted from his share of the 
equity. 
iii. Petitioner shall be awarded the amounts deducted from 
Respondent's share of the equity as stated above. 
6. The Respondent may continue to live in the home until it is 
sold. If he chooses to remain in the home, Respondent should 
continue to pay $200.00 a month toward the mortgage as well 
as all utilities associated with the home while living there. 
3 of 8 
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Respondent should pay the $200.00 to Petitioner each month. 
The Respondent should take good care of the home and 
should keep it in condition where it can be shown and in a 
condition that is acceptable to the realtor that is selected by 
the parties. 
7. The parties should mutually agree upon the realtor selected to 
sell the home and each should cooperate to get the home sold 
so that the equity can be taken out of the home and divided as 
ordered in paragraph 8(b). 
8. If there is a problem that develops and the realtor is of the 
opinion that the home is not being sold because it is being 
lived it, the parties can address the issue with the Court by 
providing the Court with the information from the realtor. 
9. Petitioner's request for $5,328.00 in mortgage payments that 
she paid while Respondent was residing in the home will not 
be granted. Respondent will be responsible for the $200.00 a 
month to be paid toward the monthly mortgage payment as 
previously ordered in paragraph 8{b)(i), but no further 
recoupment will be ordered. 
INHERITANCE 
10. As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the 
4of 8 
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Court believes that the Partnership was an inheritance. The 
way the Court views it is that the Petitioner's mother helped 
the parties. The Court believes that the help was appropriate, 
that there was a need there, and that Petitioner's mother 
addressed that need. 
11. The court finds that all of the monies the came from the 
partnership and distributions out of the partnership, not 
including gifts from the mother that came from her personal 
assets, were the Petitioner's inheritance. 
12. In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family 
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule} A, 
which states "All right title and interest in and to the following: 
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership." 
13. The court believes that all interest of Sharon L. Smith in the 
Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership included 
distributions and they were simply part of the partnership. 
14. The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to 
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner. 
15. The court believes the language of number 2 of Exhibit 
(Schedule A) was for other assets but did not include interest 
5 of8 
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in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership. 
16. The Court finds that in order to pay family expenses, Petitioner 
used some proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came 
in. She used those for the family to survive. The court finds 
those amounts were comingled, but that she did not comingle 
the larger payment of $750,000.00 that was distributed from 
the partnership, and that remains as the Petitioner's sole and 
separate property. 
17. Petitioner is entitled to funds in the Zions and LPL (formerly 
Edward Jones) account and the accounts are the sole 
property of the Petitioner. 
ALIMONY 
18. The court understands the Respondent has medical 
circumstances and that he receives Social Security Disability 
in the amount of $1,198.00 per month as a result of those 
circumstances. 
19. The Court finds that the Respondent has unmet needs. 
20. The Court finds that the Court, in this case, should look at 
separate property of the Petitioner in looking at the unmet 
needs of Respondent. 
21. The Court, in calculating Respondent's unmet needs, finds 
6 of 8 
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that Respondent's declaration has overstated his needs, and 
therefore sets his needs at $1,700.00 per month. 
22. The Court finds that Respondent's income is $1,198.00 per 
month and that his unmet expenses are $1,700.00 per month 
leaving a need for alimony in the amount of $502.00 per 
month. 
23. The court finds that Petitioner should pay alimony to 
Respondent in the amount of $502.00 per month, not to 
exceed the length of the marriage. Alimony should terminate 
upori death, marriage, or cohabitation by the Respondent. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
24. Each party should pay their own attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court as set forth above. 
2. The parties shoulq be granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
3. That the personal property should be awarded as set forth above. 
4. That the real property should be distributed as set forth above. 
5. That Petitioner's interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership is her 
separate inheritance. 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 7 of8 
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6. That the Zions account and the LPL account should be awarded as set forth 
above. 
7. That Respondent has an unmet need for alimony and that alimony should be 
awarded as set forth above. 
8. That attorney fees should be discharged as set forth above. 
Approved as to Farm and Content 
/s/ Michael D. Black 
Electronically signed by Jaime Topham with permission of Michael D. Black 
Attorney for Respondent 
END OF ORDER 
In accordance with the Utah State District Court's Efiling Standard No. 4, 
and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 10{e), this Order does not bear the 
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic 
signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order. 
**1rir'll-k*******Hirlr**********rlr**'l1rlr* 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 
:.. 
.. ·-- -.... 
8 of 8 
nnoot61 
!:j 
~:; 
iJ 
I 
I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of ... , UT ST§ 30-3-5 
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 30. Husband and Wife 
Chapter 3. Divorce (Refs & Almos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition ofproperty--Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children--Dh,ision of debts--Court to have continuingjurisdiction--Custody and 
parent-time--Determination of alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
Currentness 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses 
of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-
payments, co-insurance, and deductibles; 
(b )(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance 
of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, 
or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take 
effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of 
the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of 
debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services; and 
: .. ::S::.. .::.·.·., © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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(e) if either party owns a life insurance policy or an annuity contract, an acknowledgment by the court that 
the owner: 
(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries; 
(ii) has affim1ed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce 
becomes final; and 
(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the policy or contract, the beneficiaries currently listed will 
receive any funds paid by the insurance company under the tenns of the policy or contract. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all 
or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the 
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to 
provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and father after 
entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(S)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the 
immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace 
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
( 6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the 
court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent 
or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs 
incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation 
or parent-time. 
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(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying 
for education received by the payor spouse or enabling the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms 
thereof. 
(c) "Fault" means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to 
the breakup of the marriage relationship: 
(i) engaging in sexual relations with a person other than the party's spouse; 
(ii) knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the other party or minor 
children; 
(iii) knowingly and intentionally causing the other party or minor children to reasonably fear life-threatening 
harm; or 
(iv) substantially undermining the financial stability of the other party or the minor children. 
(d) The court may, when fault is at issue, close the proceedings and seal the court records. 
( e) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the 
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time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, 
the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(f) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties• respective standards of 
living. 
(g) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property 
and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through 
the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
(h) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(i)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony 
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient 
that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that 
justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payormay not be considered, except 
as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper 
conduct justifies that consideration. 
(j) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, 
at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment 
of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the 
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony 
is made a party to the action of annulment and the payor party's rights are determined. 
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(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Credits 
Laws 1909, c. 109, § 4; Laws 1969, c. 72, § 3; Laws 1975, c. 81, § I; Laws 1979, c. I IO,§ I; Laws 1984, c. 13, § I; 
Laws I 985, c. 72, § I; Laws 1985, c. 100, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 257, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 152, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 261, 
§ 1; Laws 1994, c. 284, § I; Laws 1995, c. 330, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; 
Laws 1999, c. 168, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 277, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 255, § 4, eff. 
April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 176, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 129, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2010, c. 
285, § I, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2013, c. 264, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2013, c. 373, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013. 
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1212; C.L. 1907, § 1212; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933, § 40-3-5; C. 1943, § 40-3-5. 
Notes of Decisions ( 1483) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5, UT ST§ 30-3-5 
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THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST 
INCLUDING 
THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST AND 
THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST 
ARTICLE I 
TRANSFER IN TRUST 
For good and valuable consjderation, the Trustors, Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. 
Smith, husband and wife, of Grantsville. State of Utah, hereby transfer and deliver to the 
Trustees and their successors the property listed in Schedule 11A''. annexed hereto and 
jncorporated herein by reference, to have and to hold the same, and any cash, 
securities or other property which the Trustees may, pursuant to any of the provisions 
hereof, at any tf me hereafter hold or acquire. all of such property being hereinafter 
referred to collectivefy as the ''Trust Estate'\ for the uses and purposes and upon the 
terms and conditions herein set forth. 
ARTICLE II 
ADDITIONS TO TRUST 
A. lt is understood that the Trustors or any other person may grant and the 
Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional real and personal property by 
assignment, transfer, deed or other conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary 
or inter vlvos, for inclusion in the Trus.t herein created. 
B. The Smith Family Trust shall be divided into two separate Trusts, The 
Keith L. Sm.ith Trust and The Sharon L. Smith Trust. Any additional property received 
by the Trustee shall become a part of the Trust into which it is transferred and shall 
become subject to the terms of this Agreement. If such property is not specifically 
appointed to any particular Trust, it shall be allocated equally between The Keith L. 
Smith Trust and The Sharon L. Smith Trust, if both of the Trustors are living, and 
otherwise to the Shelter Trust set forth herein. Property held in the name of "THE 
SMITH FAMILY TRUST'1 shall be allocated equally between the two Trusts and shall be 
subject to the respective provisions in the next two sentences. Property held as "THE 
KEITH L. SMITH TRUST'' ls the exclusive property of Keith L. Smith, and Sharon L. 
11 DEPOSITION I EXHIBIT 
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Smith hereby expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and 
separate property interests, therein. Property held as lrfHE SHARON L. SMITH 
TRUST" is the exclusive property of Sharon L. Smith, and Keith L. Smith hereby 
expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and separate 
property interests, therein. . 
C. Unmatured life insurance policies transferred to the Trust at the death of 
either of the Trustors shall be allocated to the Shelter Trust and shafl be under control of 
the Trustees of that Trust, except if the insured is a Trustee of that Trust; then the 
control shall rest solely in the Co-Trustee named or with the successor Trustees named 
after the insured. 
ARTICLE Ill 
SIGNATURES 
The Truster, Keith Lance Smith, has signed his name and is known by his whole 
name or by a portion thereof only or by a certain combination of names and the initials 
thereof. The Truster, Sharon Lynn Smith , has signed her name and is known by her 
whole name or by a portion thereof only or by certain combinations of names and initials 
thereof, and also by the name of Mrs. Keith L. Smith, and a portion only of said name or 
the initials thereof. Regardless of what combinations of the names and signatures of 
the Trustors appear on past, present or future written documents, the names and 
signatures of the Trustors, as written below, are intended by the Trustors and shall be 
effective to transfer and convey the property listed in said written documents into this 
Trust. 
ARTICLE IV 
GOVERNING LAW 
The validity of this trust and the construction of its beneficial provisions shall be 
governed by the laws of the State of Utah in force from time to time. Questions with 
regard to the construction and administration of the trusts contained in this Agreement 
shall be determined by reference to the laws of the State in which the trust is then 
currently being administered. 
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ARTICLEV 
NO BOND REQUIRED 
No Trustee named_ herein need give bond in any Jurisdiction. If a fiduclary's bond 
may not be dispensed with, the Trustors request that the bond be accepted without 
surety and in the fowest possible amount In the absence of breach of trust, no Trustee 
shaff ever be required to quaJify before, be appointed by, or account to any court, or 
obtain the order or approval of any court in the exercise of any power or discretion 
herein given. 
ARTICLE VI 
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT 
A. As long as both of the Trustors are alive, each of them reserves the right, 
without the consent or approval of the other, to amend, modify or revoke their s·eparate 
Trusts under this Agreement, in whole or in part, including this Tnist, concerning the 
property that each has contributed to the Trust, in whole or in part, also including the 
principal and the present or past undisbursed income from such principaJ. Such 
revocation shall be by an instrument in writing signed by the Trustors and shall be 
effective upon signing without notice to any successor Trustee. After the first of the 
. Trustors has died, the survivor may amend or revoke only the Suivivor's Trust 
provisions pertaining to the assets transferred therein by the surviving Truster, and may 
not, however, amend or revoke the QTIP Marital Trust. The Shelter Trust shall continue 
as an irrevocable Trust and will be administered and distributed as set forth herein. On 
the death of the survivor of the Trustors, the remainder of ihe Trust Estate and the 
Trusts created heretnafter shall become irrevocable. 
B. While any of these Trusts remain revocable, the Trustors may,_ in their 
discretion, make such use of the funds or properties of these Trusts as they may deem 
prudent, and such use shall be deemed to have been made with the consent and 
approval of the Trustees as though a formal writing were submitted in accordance with 
the provisions above. 
C. The interest of the beneficiaries is a present Interest which shall continue 
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as this Trust 
subsists, the Trust properties and all rights and privileges thereunder shall be controlled 
and exercised by the Trustees named herein. 
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ARTICLE VII 
STATEMENT OF INTENTION 
It is specifically the intention of the Trustors that all real and personal properties 
now owned by the Trustors are to be a part of this Trust; provided further, that all future 
real and personal properties acquired by the Trustors are to be a part of, or to 
automatically become a part of, this Trust at the time acquired by the Trustors. 
ARTICLE VIII 
INEFFECTUAL PROVISIONS 
lf any provision of this Trust Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining 
provisions, nevertheless, shall be carried into effect. 
ARTICLE IX 
GENDER 
In any provision of this Trust Agreement. the masculine includes the feminine 
and vice versa, and the neuter includes the masculine or feminine and vice versa. 
Where applicable, the singular includes the plural ~nd vice versa. 
ARTICLEX 
PERPETUITJES SAVJNGS CLAUSE 
In any event, and anything to the contrary herein contained notw[thstanding. the 
Trust created in this Agreement shall be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities in 
place in the jurisdiction governing this trust 
In the event of the termination of this Trust as provided for herein, the Trustee 
shall distribute the Trust Estate as ft shall then be constituted, together with any net 
income, to the beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate, in the 
same proportions in which they are entitled to such Income. 
ARTICLE XI 
SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION 
After any of the Trusts created herein becomes irrevocable, the interests of each 
beneficiary in Income and principal shall be free from the control or interference of any 
creditor of such beneficiary or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or the parent of a 
chfld beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or be subject to assignment 
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either voluntarily or involuntarily. Each and every beneficiary under this Trust and the 
various estates created hereunder is hereby restrained from and shall be without right1 
power or authority to sell, transfer, assign. pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, alienate, 
anticipate, bequeath or devise, or in any manner affect or impair his, her or their 
beneficial right, title, Interest, claim and estate In and to either the income or principal of 
any trust created hereunder, or to any part thereof, during the entire terms of said trusts; 
nor shall the right, title, interest or estate of any beneficiary be subject to any right, 
claim, .demand, lien or judgment of any creditor of any such beneficiary, nor be subject 
nor liable to any process of law or equity, but all of the income and principal, except as 
otheiwise provided in this Trust Agreement shall by the Trustee be payable and 
deliverable to or for the benefit of only the named and designated beneficiaries. as set 
forth in this trust agreement, and receipt by such beneficiaries shall relieve the Trustee 
from responsibility for such good faith distributions. This spendthrift clause shall not be 
construed to limit in any way the survivor of the Trustors' rights to Income or principal 
under the Shelter Trust or the Marital Trust 
ARTICLE XII 
· PARTIES DEALING WITH TRUSTEES 
No purchaser and no issuer of any stock, bond or other instrument evidencin~t_a_. 
deposit of money or property, or other person dealing with the Trustees hereunder with 
respect to any property hereunder, as purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or (ease or 
in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any obligation whatsoever to see to 
the disbursing of money paid to the Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any 
particular, but such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustees on the 
same basis as though the Trustees were the absolute owner of the said property, 
without any conditions, restrictions or qualifications whatsoever. 
ARTICLE XIII 
DELEGATION OF AUTHORllY 
When a Trustor is unable or unwilling to se1Ve as Trustee under this Trust 
Agreement due to death, resignation or Incompetence. the remaining Trustor shall seive 
as Trustee. 
When the original Trustors are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee under this 
Trust Agreement due to death. resignation or incompetence, the successor Trustees in 
5 
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the order of succession set forth in Article XXVII shall serve as Trustees. For all 
purposes of this Trust, each Trustee shall continue to be deemed mentally competent, 
unless determined not to be competent by two physicians selected by the Co-Trustee or 
the successor Trustee. The physicians shall not be liable for any determination made 
as to the competency of the Trustee if the determination is made in a reasonable 
manner. 
ARTICLE XIV 
POWER OF THE TRUSTEES 
A. Toe Trustees shall have full power to do everything in administering these 
Trusts that they deem to be for the best interests of the beneficiaries (whether or not it 
be authorized or appropriate for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of authority) 
including, but not lirnlted to, the following: 
1. To buy. sell and trade in securities of any nature, including short 
sales and on margin, and for such purposes may maintain and operate margin 
accounts with brokers, and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them 
with such brokers as securtty for loans and advances made to the Trustees, and 
to acquire by purchase or otherwise and to retain, so long as they deem 
advisable1 any kind of realty or personal property or undivided interests therein, 
including common and preferred stocks. bonds or other unsecured obligations, 
options, warrants, Interests in limited partnerships, investment trusts and 
discretionary common trust funds, all without diversification as to kind or amount, 
without being limited to investments authorized by law for the investment of trust 
funds, and power to hold or take title to property tn the name of a nominee; 
2. To sell for cash or on credit, at private or public sale, exchange, 
hypothecate, sell short or otherwise dispose of any real or personal property; 
3. To make distributions as authorized in this Trust Agreement, 
including distributions to themselves as Trustees, in kind or in money or partly in 
each, even if shares be composed differently. For such purposes, the valuatron 
of the Trustees shall be given effect, if reasonably made; 
4. To withhold from distribution, in the Trustee's discretion, at the tlme 
for distribution of any property fn this trust, without the payment of interest, all or 
any part of the property, as long as the Trustee shall detennine In the Trustee's 
discretion that such property may be subject to conflicting claims. to tax 
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deficiencies, or to liabilities, contingent or otherwise, properly incurred in the 
administration of the estate. 
5. If, in the Trustees' discretion, any beneficiary (whether a minor or of 
Jegal age) is incapabre of making proper disposition of any sum of income or 
principa1 that is payable or appointed to said beneficiary under the terms of this 
Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to or on behalf of the 
beneficiary by any one or more of the following methods: by payments on behalf 
of the beneficiary to anyone with whom the beneficiary resides, by payments in 
discharge of the beneficiary's bills or debts, incfudlng bifls for premiums on any 
insurance policies, or by paying an allowance to a beneficiary directly. The 
foregoing payments shall be made without regard to other resources of the 
beneficiary or the duty of any person to support the beneficiary and without the 
intervention of any guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the 
Trustees shall insure and see to the application of the funds for the benefit of the 
beneficiary, so that the funds will not be used by any adult person, or any other 
person for a purpose other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and 
particularly so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support 
and education of said beneficiary; 
6. To determine whether and to what extent receipts should be 
deemed income or principal, whether or to what extent expenditures should be 
charged against principal or income; and what other adjustments should be 
made between principal and ~ncome, provided such adjustments do not conflict 
with well-settled rules for the detennination of principal and Income questions; 
7. To deregate powers to agents including accountants 1 investment 
counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts, remunerate them and pay 
their expenses, to employ custodians of the trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks 
and other assistants and pay them out of income or principal; · 
8. To execute or enter into contracts, deeds, agreements or any other 
documents of any nature whatsoever which the Trustees deem necessary or 
desirable to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Trusts, to renew, 
assign. alter, extend, compromise, ref ease, with or without consideration, or 
submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against 
the Trustors, the Trustees or the trust assets; 
9. To borrow money from others or from the Trustees. for the payment 
of taxes, debts or expenses, or for any other purpose which, ln the opinion of the 
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Trustees, will facilitate the adminlstration of these Trusts, and pledge or 
mortgage property as security for any such loans, and if money is borrowed from 
any Trustee (ndividually, to pay interest thereon at the then prevailing rate of 
interest; 
10. To lend money to any person. including the probate estate of either 
Truster, provided that any such loan shall be adequately secured and shall bear 
a reasonable rate of interest 
11. To lease, or grant options to Jease. for periods to begin presently or 
in the future, without regard to statutory restrictions or the probable duration of 
any Trust, to erect or alter buildings or otherwise improve and manage property, 
demolish buildings, make ordinary and extraordinary repairs, grant easements 
and changes, make party wall contracts, dedicate roads, subdivide, adjust 
boundary lines, partition and convey property or give money for equity of 
partition; 
12. To operate, either solely or in conjunction with others, any business 
operation or enterprise of any nature, whether it be an individual business, 
general or limited partnership or corporation, for as long a time .and in such a 
manner as the Trustees deem proper for the best interests of the Trust, with full 
power to organize and/or operate as a soJe proprietorship or partnership, to 
incorporate such business or to execute or join in any plan of refinancfng, 
merger, consolidation or reorganization thereof with full power to borrow monies 
as the Trustees may deem advisable for the purposes thereof; 
13. To charge to operating expenses all current costs of amortization, 
obsolescence and depreciation of any properties of the Trust and to provide 
adequate reserves for such amortization, obsolescence and depreciation; 
14. To effect and keep in force Jife, fire, rent, title, liability or casualty 
insurance, or other insurance of any nature, in any form, and in any amount; 
15. To enter into transactions with any other trusts in which the 
Trustors or the beneficiaries of this Trust Agreement, or any of them, have 
beneficial interests1 even though any trustee of such other trust is also a Trustee 
under this Trust Agreement; 
16. To exercise all the foregoing powers alone or in conjunction with 
others, even though any of the Trustees are personally interested in the property 
that is involved, notwithstanding any rules of law. reJating to divided loyalty or 
self~ealing; 
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17. To invest in common trust funds, to hold and invest the funds of all 
Trusts in solido without a physical division of the assets, as the Trustees in their 
discretion may determfne. 
18. To consolidate, for the purposes of unified administration on[y, the 
assets of any trust created herein with the assets of any other trust created 
herein, to the extent it declares the same to be the best interest of the respective 
trust. Furthermore, there need be no physical segregation or division of the 
various trusts, except segregation or division may be required by the termination 
of any of the trusts, but the Trustee shall keep separate accounts for the different 
undivided Interests; 
19. To take any action and to make any election, in the Trustee's 
discretion, to minimize the tax liabilities of this trust and its beneficiaries and it 
shall have the power to allocate the benefits among the various beneficiaries, or 
between the income and principal accounts, to compensate for the 
consequences of any tax eleqtion or any investment or to administrative decision 
that the Trustee believes has had the effect of directly or indirectly preferring one 
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries over others. 
B. Any Trustee may decHne to act or may resign as Trustee at any time by Q delivering a written resignation to the beneficiaries of a Trust then subsisting. 
0 
C. Any Trustee may1 from time to time, delegate to one or more of the 
remaining Trustees any powers, duties or discretions. Every such delegation shall be a 
writing delivered to the delegate or delegates and shall remain effective for the time 
therein specified or until earlf er revocation by a further writing similarly delivered. 
Everyone dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the 
certificate of any Trustee as to whom the Trustees are acting for and as to the extent of 
their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise. 
D. From the income of the Trusts hereby created or, if that be insufficient, 
from the principal thereof, the Trustees shall pay and discharge all expenses incurred in 
the administration of the Trusts. 
E. No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance of any prior 
Trustee. 
F. The Trustee shall be prohibited from making any payments in 
reimbursement to any governmental entity which may have incurred expenses for the 
benefit of a beneficiary, and the Trustees shall not pay any obligation of a beneficiary 
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ARTICLE XV 
COURT SUPERVISION NOT REQUIRED 
All trusts created under this Agreement shall be administered free from the active 
supervision of any court. 
Any proceedings to seek judicial instructions or a judicial determination shall be 
Initiated by the Trustee in the appropriate state court having original jurisdiction of those 
matters relating to the construction and administration of trusts. 
ARTICLE XVI 
RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS 
A During the lifetime of the Trustors, the Trustee shall acoount only to the 
Trustors and their written approval shall be final and conclusive in respect to 
transactions disclosed in the account as to all beneficiaries of the trust, including unborn 
and contingent beneficiaries. After the death of one of the Trustors, the Trustee shall, in 
addition to any accounting required under applicable law, render an accounting, from 
time to time, but not less frequently than annually, regarding the transactions of any 
trust created in this instrument. Accountings shall also be rendered by any Trustee 
within 30 days after his resignation or removal by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
B. Accountings shall be made by delivering a written accounting to each 
beneficiary entitled to current income distributions or, If there are no current Income 
beneficiaries, to each beneficiary entitled to any current distribution out of income or 
principal, and each rematnderman in being. If any person entitled to receive an 
accounting i~ a minor or is under a disability! the accounting shall be delivered to his 
parents or the guardian of his person if he is a minor or to the guardian or conservator 
of his person if he Is under any other disability. Unless any beneficiary1 including 
parents, guardians or conservators of beneficiaries, shall deliver a written objection to 
the Trustee within sixty (60) days after receipt of the Trustee's accounting, the account 
shall be final and conclusive in respect to transactions disclosed in the accounting as to 
all beneficiaries of the trust, including unborn and unascertalned beneficiaries. After 
settlement of the accounting by agreement of the parties objecting to It, or by expiration 
of the sixty (60) day period, the Trustee shall no longer be liable to any beneficiary of 
10 
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ARTICLE XVII 
CERTIFIED COPIES OF TRUST 
To the same effect as if It were the original, any person or institution may rely 
upon a copy certified by a Notary Public to be a true copy of this instrument and any 
schedules or exhibits attached hereto. Any person or institution may rely upon any 
statement of fact certified by anyone who appears from the original Trust, or a certified 
copy thereof, to be a Trustee hereunder. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
DEATH 
If either of the Trustors has a serious Illness or operation, the Trustors request 
that the Trustees call J. RANDALL R(CHARDS, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to obtain instructions In case either of the Trustors should die. If death makes this prior 
conversation impossible, then the Trustees should call said attorney as soon as 
possible. 
ARTICLE XIX 
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS 
This Trust has been prepared in duplicate, each copy of which has been 
executed as an original. One of these executed copies is In the possession of the 
Trustors, and the other is deposited for safekeeping with J. RANDALL RICHARDS, 
Attorney at Laws Salt Lake City, Utah. Either copy may be used as an original without 
the other and. if only one copy of this Trust Agreement can be found. then it shall be 
considered as the ortginal and the missing copy will be presumed inadvertently lost. 
Clarifications or instructions concerning this Trust Agreement may be obtained by 
calling said law firm. 
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ARTICLE XX 
PROVISIONS RELATING 
TO POLICIES OF INSURANCE 
In the event the Trustee is named the beneficiary under any policies of 
insu ranee, said Trustee shall hold the same, subject to order of the owner of the policy, 
without obligation other than the safekeeping of any policies which may be delivered to 
the Trustee. 
The owner of the policy retains all rights, options and privileges with respect to 
said policies. Upon receiving possession of Insurance policies, proof of death of the 
insured, or upon maturity of any policies prtor to the death of the insured, the trustee 
shall use reasonable efforts to collect all sums payable on such policies for which the 
Trust is designated a beneficiary or owner. All insurance se~lements as received by the 
Trustee shall become principal of the Trust Estate, except interest paid by the insurer, 
which shall be classed as Income. The Trustee may compromise, arbitrate or otherwise 
adjust claims upon any of the policies. The receipt of the Trustee to the insurance 
company shall be .a full discharge of the company. 
The Trustee shall not be responsible for payment of any Insurance premiums or 
any act or omission of the insured or the owner of the policy. The Trustee shall not be 
required to prosecute any action, to collect any insurance or to defend any action 
relating to any policy of insurance unless indemnified against costs and expenses, 
including attorney's fees. 
ARTICLE XXI 
DISPOSITION DURING JOINT 
LIVES OF THE TRUSTORS 
During 1he joint lives of the Trustors, the Trustees shall hold, manage, Invest and 
reinvest the Trust Estate, and shall collect the income thereof and shall dispose of the 
net income and principal as follows: 
A. (ncome. The Trustees shall pay to the Trustors all of the net Income of 
this Trust, in monthly or.other convenient installments, but at least semi-annually. 
8. Principal. The Trustees may, In their discretion, pay or apply for the 
benefit of the Trustors, in addition to the Income payments herein provided for, such 
amounts of the principal of the Trust Estate, up to the whole thereof, as the Trustees 
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may from time to time deem necessary or advisable for the use and benefit of the Q Trustors. 
0 
C. Incapacity. If, in a Trustee's soJe and absolute judgment, either of the 
Trustors is so incapacitated by reason of illness, age, or other cause that he or she is 
incapable of handling funds for his or her own use and benefit, or if unavailable to give 
prompt attention to his or her financial affairs, the Trustee may use so much of the net 
income and principal of the Trust Estate as the Trustee, in Trustee's sole and absolute 
discretion, deems necessary or advisable, (1) for the comfortJ support, maintenance, 
health and education of said incapacitated Trustor and any person who, in the judgment 
of the Trustee, is dependent upon said incapacitated Trustor. (2) for the payment of 
premiums on any insurance policies owned by said Incapacitated Trustor, whether or 
not subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement, and (3) for the purpose of discharging 
any debt or obligation incurred by said incapacitated Truster and believed by the 
Trustee to be a valid debt including, but not Jimited to: home rental/mortgage payments, 
utilities, installment obligations and established charitable contriqution customs. 
ARTICLE XXII 
DISPOSITION AFTER DEATH 
OF THE FIRST OF THE TRUSTORS 
A. At the death of the first of the Trustors (and In case of simultaneous 
deaths, this Trust will operate as if the wife had survived the husband), after payment of 
currently due debts, expenses and costs of last illness and funeral out of the decedent's 
Estate, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into three separate Trusts, hereinafter 
designated as the "Marital Trust", the "Shelter Trust" and the 11Survivor's Trust'', 
respectively. 
B. The Marital Trust shall consist of a fractional proportion in all property of 
the first of the Trustors to die that qualifies for the marital deduction determined as 
follows: 
1. The numerator of such fractional proportion of the Trust Estate shall 
be the smallest amount which, if allowed as a marital deduction, would result fn 
the least possible federal estate tax being payable as a result of the Truster's 
death, after allowing for the unified credit against federal estate tax and all 
available credits and deductions claimed. 
13 
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The numerator shall be reduced by the value of any other property which 
passes to the Trustor's spouse which qualifies for the marital deduction other 
than the trust property. 
2. The denominator of this fraction shall be the value of the entire trust 
property .. Values assigned to property for purposes of this computation shall be 
those values finally determined for federal estate tax purposes. The Trustee 
shall have the power to distribute assets, in cash or in kind, to the respective 
Trusts and to select specific property to be distributed to the respective Trusts 
without regard to the income tax basis of such property. In making these 
allocations, the Trustee shall use the value of the assets as of the date or dates 
of distrtbution, so that each distribution shares proportionately in the appreciation 
or depreciation of assets between the date of the Trustor's death and the date or 
dates of distribution. However, no allocation of assets shall be made to the 
Marital Trust which do not qualify for the marital deduction. The Trustee shall 
have the power to select specific property to be distributed to the Trusts without 
regard to the income tax basis of such property. To the extent that other assets 
whfch qualify for the marital deduction are available, there shall not be allocated 
to the Marital Trust: (a) assets with respect to which an estate tax credit for 
foreign taxes paid is allowable; (b} United States Treasury Bonds that are ellgible 
for redemption at par value in payment of the federal estate tax. In computing 
the marital deduction, all generation-skipping transfers for which the Trustor is 
the "deemed transferor" shall be disregarded. 
C. The Marital Trust shall be h~ld by the Trustees separately in trust for the 
following purposes: 
1. The Trustee shall collect the income on said Trust and pay or apply 
for the surviving spouse the net income thereof, in quarterly or other convenient 
installments (but at least annually), for and during the tenn of said surviving 
spouse's life. 
2. Any remaining trust corpus shall be added at the death of the 
surviving spouse to the Shelter Trust and shall be held and administered as a 
part thereof; provided, however, that the Trustees shall first pay from the Marital 
Trust the last illness and funeral expenses and any death taxes of the survivor of 
the Trustors. 
D. The Survivor's Trust shall consist of the property which is the exclusive 
ownership of the surviving spouse. such as said surviving spouse's interest in all 
14 
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community property and separate property belonging to said survivor or said suivivor's 
Trust. Said Trust Estate Is under the fuU control of the surviving Truster and, if not 
appointed otherwise, shall, upon the death of the surviving spouse, be distributed 
pursuant to the provisions of the Shelter Trust. 
E. The Shetter Trust shall contain the balance of the Trust Estate remaining 
after setting aside all property of the Trust Estate that is included in the Marital Trust 
and Su,vivors Trust The Shelter Trust shall be subject to the payment of all the death 
taxes of the first of the Trustors to die and shall be held by the Trustees separately in 
trust for the foJlowing purposes: 
1. The Trustees may dis~ribute the income o~ the Shelter Trust among 
the Issue of both of the Trustors as the suivivor of the Trustors may appoint. 
2. During the lifetime of the surviving Truster, the Trustees of the 
Shelter Trust may distribute to said survivor such part or all of the net 
unappointed income and principal of the Shelter Trust as said Trustee, in his sole 
discretion, determines necessary or appropriate for the support and maintenance 
of said survivor in the standard of livfng to which the surviving Truster is 
accustomed, including reasonably adequate health, medical, dental, hospital, 
nursing and invalidism expenses. The powers herein granted to the surviving 
T rustor, while serving as a Trustee or Co-Trustee of this Trust Agreement, shall 
be limited as follows: The suiviving Truster shall have no right to determine the 
amount of any income or principal of the Shelter Trust to be retained or to be 
distributed to said survivor or to distribute such but such determination and 
distribution shall be made by the Trustee or Trustees serving with the surviving 
Truster. If such survivor ls serving as sole Trustee of this Trust Agreement, then 
said determination and distribution snalJ be made by the successor Trustee or 
Trustees named immediately after the Trustors in this Trust Agreement. 
3. The suNiving Trustor shall have the unrestricted power at any time 
to invade the principal of the Shelter Trust (nonmarital trust) annually, to the 
e)Ctent of the greater of the following amounts: a} the sum of $5,000 or b) 5% of 
the fair market value of the property of the Shelter Trust determined by the 
Trustee as of the end of the month immediately preceding the request This 
power shall be noncumulative and the power with respect to each year shall, if 
not exercised, lapse on the last day of each calendar year the power is held. The 
exercising of this power shall be made in writing by said surviving Truster to the 
Trustee. 
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4. Upon the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trustees shall dispose 
of the unappo[nted remaining principal and income of the Shelter Trust as 
directed in Article XXHI. 
F. Statutory interests, if any, of the survivor of the Trustors, in his or her 
spouse's real and personal property, is hereby expressly waived by both of the Trustors. 
G. lf this Trust is named beneficiary under any retirement plan, then such 
amounts so received shall be held pursuant to the provisions of Article XXII, paragraph 
E, provided further, that no federal estate nor state Inheritance taxes nor any debts or 
liabilities of the deceased Truster/plan participant may be paid from such proceeds. 
H. Jf the Trustors or any primary and secondary beneficiary die 
slmuJtaneously or under such conditions that it cannot be determined from credible 
evidence which of them was the first to die, the provisions made herein for the surviving 
spouse shaJl be construed as though 1he Trustor-wife survived the Truster-husband. 
My secondary beneficiary shall be deemed to have predeceased the primary 
beneficiary. 
ARTICLEXXHI 
DISPOSITION ON DEATH OF 
THE SURVIVING TRUSTOR 
All Trust princlpal1 with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed 
of under the provisions herein. shall, upon the death of the survivor of the Trustors 1 be 
held in Trust for the benefit of the following beneficiaries of the Trustors and shall be 
disposed of as follows: 
A. An amount determined by the Trustees1 in their sole dfscretion, shall be 
set aside from the balance of the funds held in Trust and shall be used for the support1 
maintenance, health insurance or to meet the costs of any illness or accfdent and 
education of the beneficiaries of this Trust as determined by Article XXlll 1 paragraph c, 
who have not reached age 21 prior to the death of the survivor of the Trustors. 
Education of the beneficiaries shall include, but not be limited to, musical education1 
dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary school1 college, graduate school, trade 
school1 private school and vocational training schooJ. 
In determining the amount to be set aside under the provisions of this paragraph 
and the amounts to be paid therefrom, the Trustees shall take into account the needs, 
ages, assets and other available sources of Income and support of the beneficiaries, 
including each beneficiarys ability to contribute to his or her own support The Trustees 
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shall determine the amounts to be distributed, the beneficiary or beneficiaries to whom 
distributions are to be made, and the time and manner of distributions made under this 
paragraph and shall distribute according to the various needs of the beneficiaries, even 
if such distributions are unequal. After the youngest beneficiary described in paragraph 
B herein has attained age 21, the balance, if any, of the amounts set aside under this 
paragraph shall be distributed according to Article XXIII, paragraph C. 
B. In the event- Smith is under 18 years of age, the Trustees shall 
set aside in Trust the real property last used as the·principal residence of the Trustors, 
for the benefit of- until such time as she attains 18 years of age. The Trustees 
shall also set aside a sufficient amount of money to pay all expenses related to the 
upkeep of the principal residence. When - turns 18, the Trustees shall distribute 
the principal residence according to the provisions set forth in paragraph r:c11 below. 
C. Mer setting aside sufficient amounts to carry out the purposes of Article 
XXIII, paragraph A, above, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into as many equal 
shares as there are children of the T rustors then living and children of the Trustors then 
deceased but leaving surviving issue; provided further, that each of said shares, if not 
immediately distributed, shall constitute and be held, administered and distributed by 
the Trustees as a separate Trust, as follows: 
1. One such share shall be set aside for the benefit of each of the 
children of the Trustors who may then be living and, if held in Trust, shall 
constitute the Trust Estate of such child's Trust 
2. One such equal shar.e of the Trust Estate shall be set aside for the 
benefit of the suiviving fssue, by right of representation, of each of the children of 
the Trustors who may then be deceased but leave issue surviving and, if held in 
Trust, shall constitute the Trust Estate of such issue's Trust; the amounts so set 
aside may be used for the purposes and benefits as enumerated in Article XXIII, 
paragraph A, above. 
3. As each above-described beneficiary attains age 21, the share of 
the Trust Estate for said beneficiary shall be dfstributed to him or her free and 
clear of Trust, upon his or her request therefore, as follows: 1/3 of the Trust 
Estate shall be distributed to each beneficiary when he or she has atta(ned the 
age of 21; 1 /2 of the remafnfng balance of the Trust Estate shall be distnbuted to 
each beneficiary when he or she has attained the age of 25; and the remaining 
balance shall be distributed to each beneficiary upon attaining age 30. 
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D. Whenever used herein, the terms "issue111 "child", "childrenn and 
"descendants'' include adopted (ssue, adopted child, adopted children and adopted 
descendants, as well as natural issue, natural child, natural children and natural 
descendants, and include descendants of adopted issue, adopted ch[ld, adopted 
children and adopted descendants. 
E. · If any of the above beneficiaries are unable or unwilling to take any portion 
of the Trust Estate, then the Trustees shall distribute the portion of the property of that 
beneficiary to his or her issue by right of representation and, If none, then to the other 
Trust beneficiaries proportionate to each beneficiary's interest in the Trust and, if no 
remaining beneficiaries, then: one-half to the llvlng heirs at law of the first of the 
Trustors to die and one-half to the living heirs at law of the las~ of the Trustors to die; 
provided further, that said heirs at law of each of the_ Trustors shall take the Trust 
property in the same priority and in the same distributive order as listed in the law of 
intestate succession of the state referred to in Article I as in force on the date of the 
signing of this Trust Agreement. 
ARTICLE XXIV 
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST UPON THE DEATH OF A TRUSTOR 
A On the death of a Truster, the Trustee is authorized, but not directed to 
pay the following: 
1. Expenses of the last illness, funeral and burial of such Trustor. 
2. 
estate. 
3. 
Legally enforceable claims against such Truster or such of Truster's 
Expenses with regard to the administration of such Truster's estate. 
4. Federal estate tax, applicable state inheritance or estate taxes, or 
any other taxes occasioned by the death of such Trusler. 
5. Statutory or court ordered allowances for qualifying family 
members. 
6. The payments authorized under this Article are discretionary7 and 
no claims or right to payment by third parties may be enforced against the trust 
by virtue of such discretionary authority. 
7. The Trustee shall be indemnified from the trust property for any 
damages sustained by tJ:'le Trustee as a result of the Trustee exercising, in good 
faith, the authority granted the Trustee under this Article. 
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B. If the Trust created herein holds United States Treasury Bonds which are 
eligible for redemption at par in payment of the federal estate tax, the Trustee shall 
redeem such bonds to the extent necessary to pay federal estate tax as a result of such 
Trustor's death. 
C. This paragraph shall be utilized to help facilitate the coordination between 
the personal representative of a Trustors probate estate and the Trustee with respect to 
any property owned by the Trustors outside of this Trust Agreement on such Truster's 
death. 
1. The Trustee, in the Trustee•s sole and absolute discretion, may 
elect to pay the payments authorized under this Article either directly to the 
appropriate persons or Institutions or to the personal representative of such 
Trustors probate estate. 
The Trustee may rely upon the written statements of such Truster's 
personal representative as to all material facts relating to these payments; the 
Trustee shall not have any-duty to see to the application of such payments. 
2. The Trustee is authorized to purchase and retain in the form 
received, as an addition to the Trust, any property which is a part of such· 
Trustors probate estate. In addition, the Trustee may make Joans1 with or 
without security. to such Trustors probate estate. The Trustee shall not be liable 
for any los~ suffered by any Trust created herein as a result of the exercise of the 
powers granted in this paragraph. 
3. The Trustee Is authorized to accept distributions from the personal 
representative of an Truster's probate estate without audit and the Trustee shall 
be under no obligation to examine the records or accounts of the persona] 
representative of such Trustors probate estate. 
ARTICLEXXV 
TRUSTEE'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE TAX ELECTIONS 
The Trustee may exercise any available elections with regard to state or federal 
income, inheritance, estate, succession, or gift tax law. 
A. Alternate Valuation Date. The authority granted the Trustee in this Article 
includes the right to elect any alternate valuation date for federal estate, state estate or 
inheritance tax purposes. 
B. Tax and Reh.Jms. The Trustee may also: 
1. Sign joint tax returns. 
19 
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2. Pay any taxes, interest or penalties with regard to taxes. 
3. Apply for and collect tax refunds and interest thereon. 
C. All expenses, taxes and claims shall be paid without apportionment, and 
without reimbursement from any person. 
ARTICLE XXVI 
PERSONAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS 
All personal properties listed on the Personal Property List are to be distributed to 
the named designees and such items shall be conveyed to such persons in addition to 
their respective distributive shares of the Trust described herein. 
ARTICLE XXVII 
TRUSTEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS 
A. The present living children of the Trustors and their birth dates are: 
-Smith. - • ,1980 
-Smith _, 1985 
-Smith- -1988 
-..Smith -• 1993 
8. The following people shall serve as Trustees: 
1. - • Smith and-• Smith, Trustors, as Co-Trustees of 
The Smith Family Trust. 
2. - • Smith, Grantor, as Trustee of The-· Smith Trust. 
3. - • Smith, Grantor, as Trustee of The - Smith Trust. 
4. When a Grantor is unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the 
remaining Granter shall serve as Trustee. 
5. When neither Granter is able or willing to serve as Trustee, the 
following persons are appointed as Trustees in the following order 
of succession: 
a. -Smith. 
b. -Swenson. 
c. A Trustee chosen by a majority of beneficiaries, with a 
parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries. 
C. Whenever more than one Trustee is designated to act concurrently, a 
majority of the Trustees, whether individual or corporate, shall have the power to make 
20 
0000097 
• 
I 
I, 
h 
i' I' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I. 
• l'. 
r [ 
t 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-----··-------- ...... -:_, --~---=···-=· - -:7.!: .. · ••-::--::_ •.-:--"""'. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--
·-···..! . ._. ---······ .......... ____ ··-- ---------·-·-•·•• - . 
.... ··------ ·-··· ..... ·- -• .. ---· ..... 
0 
0 
0 
. --·· 
any decision, undertake any action, or execute any documents affecting the Trusts 
created herein. In the event of a difference of opinion among the Trustees, the decision 
of a majority of them shall prevail, but the dissenting or nonassenting Trustees shall not 
be responsible for any action taken by the majprity pursuant to ~uch d~cision. After the 
death of the first of the Trustors to die, if only two indfvldual Trustees are in office, they 
must act unanimously. If an individual and a corporate Trustee are in office, the 
determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding. 
D. Each Successor Trustee shall have the same duties and powers as are 
assumed in this Trust Agreement. 
E. No successor Trustee shall be liable for any act, omission, or default of a 
predecessor Trustee. Unless requested in writing within sixty (60) days of appointment 
by an adult beneficiary of the trust, no successor Trustee shall have any duty to 
investigate or review any action of a predecessor Trustee and may accept the 
accounting records of the predecessor Trustee showing assets on hand without further 
investigation and without incuning any liability to any person clafmf ng or having an 
interest in the trust. 
A. 
ARTICLE xxvm 
SPECIAL TRUSTEE PROVISIONS 
As used throughout this Agreement, the word Trustee shall refer to the 
original Trustee as well as any single, additional, or successor Trustee. It shall also 
refer to any individual, corporation or other entity acting as a replacement, substitute, or 
added Trustee, 
8. After the death of the first of the Trustors, the surviving Trustor shall have 
the right, from time-to--time, to discharge any Trustee or Successor Trustee of any trust 
hereunder and to appoint a successor as Trustee fn its place. Upon the death of the 
surviving Trustor, the unanimous consent of the then Beneficiaries of all Trusts then 
established shall be sufficient to discharge any Trustee or Co-Trustee and appoint a 
successor Trustee or Co-Trustee. Discharge of a Trustee shall be by delivering to such 
Trustee thirty (30) days notice of discharge accompanied by the name of the intended 
Successor Trustee. The Trustee of any trust hereunder, including any Successor 
Trustee, may resign by delivery of ninety (90) days• written notlce of resignation to au of 
the then income beneficiaries of such trust. In the event of such resignation, such 
Income beneficiaries who are adults shall have the right to appofnt a Successor Trustee 
In its place; provided, that if no such income beneficiary is an adult, then such 
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appointment shall be made by the parent or legal guardian of such incorne beneficiary; 
provided further, that in the event of dispute among such income benefictartes, their 
parents or their guardians, the majority shall prevail. 
C. As long as any individual narne.d in this instrument s~all serve as Co-
Trustee of these trusts, that individual shall have the power from time-to-time to 
delegate to the other Co-Trustee all or any of his powers as Co-Trustee during 
temporary vacation periods or other temporary periods. The power of delegation shall 
be exercised by delivery by the individual Co-Trustee to the other Co-Trustee of written 
notice specifying the powers delegated; this delegation shall terminate on delivery by 
the Individual Co-Trustee to the other Co-Trustee of written notice of tenninatlon of 
delegation. The individual Co-Trustee shall incur no liability to any beneficiary of the 
Trust Estate as a result of any action taken or not taken within the scope of delegation 
during the period of delegation. 
o. The Original Trustee or Co-Trustees shall receive no compensation for 
ordinary services performed hereunder. The Successor Trustee or Trustees, whether 
corporate or noncorporate, shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation.for 
services rendered by them or counsel retained by them1 including seivices in 
connection with the transfer of assets to beneficiaries or successor Trustees and the 
appointment of successor Trustees. Reasonable compensation shall be based upon 
the then prevailing rates charged for similar services in the locality where the same are 
performed by other fiduciaries engaged in.the trust business or acting as Trustees. 
E. The Trustee may abandon any real or personal property whf ch may be 
determined to be worthless; any such determination by the Trustee shall be binding 
upon all parties interested hereunder. 
F. If an individual Co-Trustee rs unable to participate in trust activities 
because of illness, disability, or any other reason, the remainin~ Trustee may, during 
any such incapacity, make any and all decisions regarding the Trust Estate as though it 
were the sole Trustee. In determfnfng the dfsability of the Individual Trustee, the 
remaining Trustee may rely on a certificate or other written statement from two licensed 
physicians who have examined the individu·a1 Trustee. In the absence of such a 
certificate or statement, the remaining Trustee shall petition the court having jurisdiction 
over this trust for authority to proceed as sole Trustee; under authority of this paragraph. 
Toe remaining Trustee shatl incur no liabiUty to any beneficiary of the trust or to the 
individual Trustee as a result of any action taken under this paragraph. 
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G .. This trust is created upon the express understanding that the Issuer 
0 (Including transfer agents) or custodfan of any shares of stock or mutual funds shall be 
under no liability whatsoever to see to ifs proper administration; and that upon the 
transfer of the right, title and interest in and to said shares by any Trustee hereunder, 
said issuer or custodian shall conclusively treat the transferee as the sole owner of said 
shares. In the even_t that any shares, cash, or other property shall be distributable at 
any time under the terms of said shares, the said issuer or custodian is fully authorized 
to pay, deliver and distribute the same to whosoever shall then be Trustee hereunder, 
~ and shall be under no liabillty to see the proper application thereof. The issuer or 
custodian is authorized to make such distributions under a mutual fund systematic 
withdrawal plan as have been specified by any Trustee acting hereunder. Until the 
issuer or custodian shall receive from some person Interested in this trust written notice 
of any death or other event upon with the right to receive may depend, the issuer or 
custodian shall incur no liability for payments made in good faith to persons whose ,. 
interests shall have been affected by such event. The issuer or custodian shall be 
protected in acting upon any notice or other instrument or document believed by it to be 
genuine and to have been signed or presented by the property party or parties. The 
Trustee shall have the right to pledge the shares as collateral for any loans made to the 
0 trust or to any Trustors. H. During the lifetime of the Trustors, they shall have the power in their 
discretion, to direct that the Trustee employ a reputable professional investment counsel 
of their choice, provided that the investment counsel ~hall currently be handling at least 
five other accounts of similar size. Any Investment counsel designated by the Tru·stors 
or either of them shall cqntinue to be retained in that capacity after the death of the 
survivor of the Trustors. In the absence of compelling circumstances to the contrary or 
except as provided below. On the death or legal disabnity of the surviving Truster, each 
child of the Trustors who has attained the age of 25 shall have the power, in his ~~ 
CJ) 
discretion, to direct that the Trustee employ a reputable professional _investment counsel 
of his choice (provided that the investment counsel shall currently be handling at least 
five other accounts of similar size) to supervise the investment of the trust set aside for ~ that child and hfs issue. 
The Trustee shall ab(de by the decision of the independent counsel with ,.· 
respect to property placed under his control, but shall not be held Uable or otherwise 1~ 
surcharged for losses directly attributable to investments made on the advice of the h t:C r~ independent counsel. During the period that independent counsel Is retained by the 
/0 0 23 r 
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Trustee, the Trustee shall not be required to conduct revlews of estate or trust 
investments subject to the supervision of the investment counsel, and it shall be 
required to take no action in respect to those estate or trust investments unless it shall 
receive written instructions from the investment counsel. 
In the event investment counsel is obtained, the Trustee's fees for Its 
ordinary services in respect to property subject to supervision of the investment counsel 
for the period the counsel is retained, shall be reduced a reasonable amount to take 
account of the absence of investment responsibility in respect to that property. 
ARTICLE XXIX 
NO CONTEST PROVISION 
Trustors specifically desire that the trusts created by this document shall be 
administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. If any beneficiary 
of this trust, or any other person, shall seek lo establish or assert any claim to the Trust 
Estate established herein, other than as provided in this document, or to attack, oppose, 
or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of the Trust Estate other than as 
herein set forth, then and in such event, such person or persons who shall inltlate such 
action shall receive from the Trustees the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no more in lieu 
of any interest in the Trust Estate. 
ARTICLEXXX 
S CORPORATION STOCK 
A. In the event any Trust created under this Trust Agreement owns stock in 
one (1) or more S Corporations as defined under Section 1361 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (or any successor Act provision), as amended or supplemented, the • 
following shall apply. Such Trust shall be divided into two {2) parts, held as separate 
shares. One (1) part shall consist of all assets allocated to such Trust except stock in 
any S Corporations. This part shall be held and administered In accordance with the 
provisions of the Article creating the Trust The balance of the assets, composed of 
only S Corporation stock, shall be maintained as separate equal shares for each of the 
primary beneficiaries, each of which such separate shares will constitute a QuaUfied 
Subchapter S Trust for the benefit of the said primary beneficiary as provided in the 
Article of this Trust Agreement creating such Trust For purposes of this Article, the 
tenn primary beneficiary shall mean the individual currently entitled to receive income 
24 
.0000101 
I 
I 
t;: 
~ :~ 
i' 
I' 
1 · 
I· 
i: I! 
i 
' 
[) 
! . 
) 
I· 
i 
i 
l 
t 
' 1. 
I 
I 
.. 
,€ii 
}-~ 
j·' 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0 
---···-·-·····-· -- ··===~~==---~--.•~-~----~-~ .... :-:-:-:-: ....~·••--~--"=:".":--··~··-·-~--.. ~ .. ~ ....~ ..... ~ ...• ~ .....~~~-----
·-. -~- ... ---· ---· ....... ··---....... .__ 
' I 
·. L . 
and/or principal from the Trust (but shall not include dependents of such person unless 
specifically named as a beneficiary of such Trust). Except for this provision establishing 
the separate Qualified Subchapter S Trust hereunder, all other provisions of the Article 
. establishing such Trust shall be applicable, except to the extent that the following 
specific requirements shall be applicable to such Trust. It is the Trustors 1 intention that 
each such separate share holding the S Corporation stock shall constitute a Qualified 
Subchapter S Trust. as defined in Internal Revenue Code Section 1361 (d)(3), as 
amended or supplemented, and as such, the following specific requirements shall be 
applicable to each of such separate shares: 
1. All Income of each such separate share shall be distributed to the 
primary beneficiary who shall be the income beneficiary of such separate share. 
2. During the life of the current fncome beneficiary, th~re shall be only 
one (1) income beneficiary of each such separate share. 
3. The current income beneficiary of each such separate share shall 
be a citizen or resident of the United States. 
4. Any corpus distributed during the life of the current Income 
beneficiary may be distributed only to such beneficiary. 
5. The income Interest of the current income beneficiary in the 
separate share shall terminate on the earlier of such beneficiary's death or the 
termination of the Trust. 
6. Upon the termination of the Trust during the life of the current 
income beneficiary, the Trust shall distribute all of the assets held as a separate 
share to such beneficiary. 
B. The provisions of this Article shall apply regardless of whether the election 
to be taxed as an S Corporation was made prior or subsequent to the Trustors death. 
ARTICLE XXXI 
GUARDlAN'S EXPENDITURES 
The Trustors do not desire, after their death, that the guardian of any minor 
benefi~iary should incur personal expense in the support and maintenance of such 
beneficiary. The Trustee is authorized to disburse funds from such beneficiary's Trust 
Estate for the purpose of reimbursing such guardian for reasonable expenses incurred 
in supporting and caring for such minor beneficiary. 
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ARTICLE XXXII 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
:. .... 
A Use of principal residence. On the death of the first of the Trustors, the 
surviving Trustor shall have the right to continue to occupy and use the home, that the 
surviving Truster and the deceased Trustor were using as a principal residence (if it is 
part of the Trust Estate), provided, however, that the surviving Trustor, in his or her 
discretion, may direct the Trustees to sell any such property and replace it with or rent 
or lease another residence selected by the survivor of the Trustors of comparable or 
lower value. The surviving Truster shall not be required to pay any rent for the use of 
said residence. 
B. Simultaneous Death. If there is not sufficient evidence that the Trustors 
died otherwise than simultaneously, then for purposes to this Trust Agreement it shall 
be conclusively presumed for all purposes of administration and tax effect of this Trust 
that the Decedent shall be the Husband and the Survivor shall be the Wife. 
C. Limitations of Trust Powers. Administration control and all other powers 
relating to the various Trust Estates created hereunder, shall be exercised by the 
Trustee in a fiduciary capacity and solely for the benefit of the suivivor and the Issue of 
the Trustors. Neither the Trustee. the Trustors, nor any other person, shall be permitted Q to purchase, exchange, reacquire or otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal of 
any of the various Trust Estates or the income therefrom, for less than an adequate 
interest in any case or without adequate security therefor. Any person holding a 
fiduciary power hereunder may release or reduce the scope of his power or may 
disclaim any part or all of such power. 
0 
D. Headings. Clause headings are not part of this Trust Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trustors have executed this Trust Agreement 
on the -44_ day of September, 2006, as Trustors and Trustees: 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 2:) day of 
September, 2006. by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith. 
My commission expires: 
n~~ Notak'Y ubttc 
~ngat: . 
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SCHEDULE "A" 
KEITH L. SMITH and SHARON L. SMITH, Granters, do hereby sell, transfer, 
convey, quitclaim and assign for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable 
consideration, all rights, title and interests in the property set forth below to the Grantors 
as Trustees of THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST, dated the~ day of September, 2006, 
Grantee. In addition, property listed under the ownership category as KLS is the 
exclusive property of THE KEITH l. SMlTH TRUST, property listed as SLS Is the 
exclusive property of THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST, and property designated KLS & 
SLS is owned equally by the two Trusts. 
1. All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the following real 
estate, together with all present and future improvements thereon, and all present and 
Q future water and water rights thereunto belonging and also including all present and all 
future personal property located 1hereon or wheresoever located: 
Ownership 
SLS A. -• Castagna Acres Subdivision, as described in the plat maps 
and records on file at the County Recorder's Office, Tooele County, 
State of Utah. 
Tax Parcel No.: 
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH 
. :._:._· .. •·.·.· .. . .... ••·· I 
.. -, 
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2. The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all future 
(°'i additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all new accounts and the 
\_,,' 
0 
0 
accumulations and the future additions, interest or accumulation in any and all other 
financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future: 
Ownership 
KLS & SLS A. Credit Union 
Account No. -
Prime Share 
Premier Money Market 
Budget Shares 
Choice Plus Checking 
3. Vehicles: 
Ownership 
KLS & SLS A. 2002 Chevrolet 
Vehicle Identification No.: 
Utah Title No.: 
KLS & SLS 8. 1990 Chevrolet 
4 . All right, title and interest in and to the following: 
SLS A. All interest of-I. Smith in and to --Family 
Limited Partnersfii'p,'"' an Arizona Limited "Parmer~ 
Dated the Ji_ day of Septem ber, 2006 . 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this c.It_ day of 
. September, 2006, by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith. 
My commission expires: 
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